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Chapter 1
General Introduction
Strategic feedback and uncertainty are the main ingredients in the decision-making
process. As of this writing, in China, the annual National College Entrance Exam-
ination (NCEE) finished last week. Immediately after completing the examination,
all students have to rank their three most-preferred colleges while accounting
for their expectation of the results of their exams. Not all of the students can
attend their preferred colleges because there are hundreds of millions of students
competing for places. Therefore, students have to make decisions under uncertainty
before they know their actual scores and the admission scores of different colleges.
They may over-estimate or under-estimate their scores, and they also need to take
into account the decisions of other students because the admission score could be
higher or lower than the reference value depending on how many students chose
this college.
Such examples are even more widespread in economics. When a firm is consider-
ing whether to enter a market, relative to incumbents, it may have less information
regarding market demand, costs or other factors that could affect its future profits;
moreover, it has to take into account the reactions of the incumbents. By contrast,
while an incumbent may better know the market, it must be aware of the possible
threat from potential entrants. The focus of game theory research is on how groups
of people interact. In particular, information asymmetries are omnipresent in games
because various types of uncertainty can affect the players, including the examples
mentioned above. Further examples include asset trading between institutional
investors and individual investors in financial markets; the relationships between
banks and borrowers in capital markets; and contract setting between agents and
1
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principals in labor markets.
The present thesis introduces asymmetric information into two classes of games
that are widely analysed and utilized in a variety of economic problems: zero-
sum games1 and signalling games. In chapter 2, we seek to analyse the price
dynamics of a risky asset in a financial market through a zero-sum repeated trading
game involving a more informed sector and a less informed sector. Here, the
information asymmetry involved in the trading between the two sectors is referred
to as incomplete information on one-and-a-half sides.
In chapter 3, we study the belief updating and equilibrium refinement problem
in classical signalling games, in which an informed player moves first and conveys
private information to an uninformed player through messages; the uninformed
player attempts to make inferences about hidden information and takes an action
that can influence both players’ payoffs. Here, measurable uncertainty exists only
on the second-mover side, while the first mover knows the true state of nature.
In chapter 4, the information asymmetries are extended in a broader sense,
whereby one of the players has multi-priors on the state of nature. This concept
of uncertainty is called Knightian Uncertainty or Ambiguity in the literature.
We introduce ambiguity into entry deterrence games and discuss the impact of
ambiguity in two cases of asymmetric information structures. In both cases, the
entrant faces ambiguity regarding the state of the market, but the incumbent is
either fully informed or faces classical measurable uncertainty.
1.1 Price dynamics in financial markets with asym-
metric information
In financial markets, one of the most relevant problems is to accurately identify
stock price dynamics, which not only influence trading in stock markets but also
determine the price formulae for derivatives. Price dynamics are often exogenously
modelled in terms of Brownian motion in the financial analysis literature, for
example, using Bachelier dynamics, Black and Scholes dynamics, diffusion models,
stochastic volatility models, and GARCH models. Information asymmetries are
well known in financial markets. The institutional sector have better access to
1See Sorin (2002), Aumann and Maschler (1995), Milgrom and Stokey(1982), De Meyer and
Marino (2005), Von Neumann and Morgenstern (2007),etc. for example
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information than does the individual sector. The daily, repeated trades between
the two sets of actors influence the price of stocks. For information on the series
of models based on repeated exchange games between an informed sector and an
uninformed sector to endogenously determine price dynamics, see De Meyer and
Saley (2003), De Meyer (2010), and De Meyer and Fournier (2015).
In De Meyer and Saley (2003), a zero-sum repeated game between two market
makers with incomplete information on one side is analysed. In a risk-neutral
environment, under a particular trading mechanism, this paper proves that the
price process converges to a continuous martingale involving a Brownian motion.
De Meyer (2010) generalizes this idea to a broader setting and proves that the
price dynamics must be a so-called “Continuous martingale of maximal variational”
(CMMV); see the explanation in section 2.1. This property does not rely on the
trading mechanism. De Meyer and Fournier (2015) generalize this analysis to the
case of a risk-averse market. They show that the price process is still a CMMV
under a martingale equivalent measure.
In all of these three models, the informed player is fully informed of the state
(the value of the risky asset) and has full knowledge of the beliefs of the uninformed
player. In the first chapter of this thesis, we attempt to characterize a financial
model out of this scenario. In this setting, the more informed player has private
information about the value of the risky asset, but the less informed player is
informed of some private message associated with the value. Therefore, the more
informed player is uncertain about the beliefs of his trading partner. An N-period
repeated exchange of this risky asset using the nume´raire between these two players
under this information structure is modelled by a repeated zero-sum game with
incomplete information on one-and-a-half sides, as introduced by Sorin and Zamir
(1985). We show that completely different price dynamics from those in De Meyer’s
(2010) results can be obtained by simply slightly disturbing the information of the
uninformed player.
3
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1.2 Belief updating and equilibrium refinements
in signalling games
In a dynamic decision-making process, people update their beliefs constantly as
new information arrives. Bayes’ Rule is a common assumption on belief updating
in learning theory. However, it has two limitations: first, it does not predict how
agents should react to information to which they assigned probability zero; second,
a series of psychological experiments suggest that people’s behaviour may deviate
from Bayes’ rule2. In addition, the Bayesian approach requires that we be able to
quantify this uncertainty using a single prior, which is also an imperfect method.
For example, imagine that we are considering spending a one-week holiday in some
beachfront city abroad this summer. If we make the decision earlier, we can spend
less on the hotel and flights but we are more uncertain about the weather. Can
we really assign one number to the probability of good weather conditional on the
information that we know? These findings spurred increased interest in research
on non-Bayesian learning3.
Signalling games are a widely utilized class of games in economics, as reviewed
in Riley (2001) and Sobel (2007). A signalling game typically admits multiple
sequential Nash equilibria because the second mover’s belief is not well defined by
Bayes’ rule when zero-probability messages sent by the first mover are observed.
Multi-equilibria cannot provide a precise prediction, and therefore, refinements
were developed incrementally. Some refinements rely on ad hoc criteria, while some
studies attempt to define a new concept of equilibrium; see the literature review in
section 2.1, for example.
We are interested in nesting an alternative updating rule of the Hypothesis
Testing model axiomatically characterized by Ortoleva (2012) into a class of general
signalling games and thereby providing a new equilibrium refinement method in
signalling games. Here, we present an example to briefly illustrate how the non-
Bayesian updating rule proceeds. Imagine that our agent is uncertain about a
2See the psychological experiments in Kahneman and Tversky (1974), surveys by Camerer
(1995) and Rabin (1998), and the arguments in Epstein et al. (2010) and Ortoleva (2012), among
others.
3For example, Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, 2004), Epstein (2006, 2008, 2010), Golub and
Jackson (2010), Jadbabaie et al., (2012), Gilboa et al, (2008, 2009, 2012),Teng (2014), and
Ortoleva (2012).
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state of nature; the state space is finite Ω = {ω1, ..., ωN}. The set of all of the
subsets of Ω is Σ = 2Ω. She does not have the confidence to assign one unique
probability distribution on the state space; let us say that she has two priors: pi1
and pi2. Based on her current information and knowledge, she believes that pi1
is more likely than pi2. In brief, assume that she has a prior ρ over the set of
priors, with ρ(pi1) > ρ(pi2) > 0. She has pi1 as her original prior before any new
information arrives. She has a subjective threshold for deciding whether an event
is a low-probability event, for example  = 5%. After some event A ∈ Σ is observed
(new information arrives), she computes the probability of A as pi1(A). She retains
pi1 if pi1(A) >  and proceeds with Bayesian updating on pi1 using A; otherwise,
if pi1(A) ≤ , she rejects pi1, and compares the posterior probability of pi1 and pi2
conditional on A:
pii(A)ρ(pii)
pi1(A)ρ(pi1) + pi2(A)ρ(pi2)
, i ∈ {1, 2}.
She selects the prior from {pi1, pi2} that maximizes the posterior probability above.
For example, assume that pi2 is selected. Then, she proceeds with Bayesian updating
on pi2 using A. She makes her decision as subjective expectation maximizer using
the updated probability distribution. We can see that this updating rule is non-
Bayesian if  > 0, and dynamic consistency is violated but only up to . If
 = 0, then it is dynamic consistent, and the update rule is also well defined after
zero-probability events.
In the main chapter of this thesis, we formulate signalling games nested by the
updating rule of Ortoleva (2012) and define a new equilibrium concept, Hypothesis
Testing Equilibrium (HTE). When  = 0, an HTE is a refinement of sequential
Nash equilibria. In general signalling games, HTE survives the Intuitive Criterion.
When  > 0, this is a game with non-Bayesian players. In signalling games, this
implies the uninformed player is a non-Bayesian player, the informed player knows
that the uninformed player is non-Baysian, and so forth. In this situation, an
HTE can differ from a sequential Nash equilibrium. For a broad class of signalling
games, we provide the existence and uniqueness theorems.
5
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1.3 Risk, ambiguity, and limit pricing
As in the example above regarding an attempt to anticipate the weather in a city
in another country, there are many situations for which we cannot assign a unique
prior to the uncertainty. Consider further examples. We are unable to know the
precise probability of an employee’s performance in a job for which she has no
experience before she starts to work in this position. We are also unable to assign
a unique probability to the future returns or volatilities of an IPO. However, there
also exist the situations in which we are able to precisely quantify the uncertainty
in a situation by a probability; for example, when tossing a fair coin once, we
believe that “heads” will appear with probability 1
2
; a pregnant woman will give
birth to a girl with probability 1
2
; and there are other examples for which our
subjective beliefs are determined by objective events.
Knight (1921) distinguished two types of uncertainty. Situations in which the
uncertainty can be governed by a unique probability measure are called “measurable
uncertainty” or “risk”. In contrast, we use “Knightian uncertainty” or “ambiguity”
to refer to situations in which individuals cannot or do not assign subjective
probabilities to uncertain events. The Ellsberg Paradox (Ellsberg, 1963) shows
that this distinction is behaviourally meaningful since people treat ambiguous bets
differently from risky bets. Importantly, the lack of confidence reflected by choices
in the Ellsberg Paradox cannot be rationalized by any probabilistic belief.
Many theoretical models of individuals’ preferences in decisions under ambiguity
have been proposed, including Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU) (Gilboa and
Schmeidler, 1989), smooth ambiguity preference (Klibanoff et al., 2005), and
variational representation of preferences (Maccheroni, et al., 2006). All of these
utilities can capture ambiguity aversion, but they are rarely related to one another
and are often expressed in drastically different formal languages (Epstein and
Schneider, 2010). There are still difficulties in applying these theories to dynamic
decision theory because most of the models do not satisfy the dynamic consistency
property; see the arguments in Epstein et al, (2007), Eichberger et al, (2009) and
Hanany, Klibanoff, and Mukerji (2015).
The issue of whether low prices can, in theory, deter entry is critical in com-
petition policy. A vast literature studies the theory of limit pricing and can be
dated back to Bain (1949). The seminal work by Milgrom and Roberts (1982)
6
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studies limit pricing theory in a two-period entry deterrence game with asymmetric
information in which both the incumbent and the entrant have private information
on their own costs but are uncertain about their opponent’s costs. Other studies of
the limit pricing theory for Oligopoly see Bagwell and Ramey (1991), limit pricing
theory for Bertrand equilibrium by Chowdhury (2002), and signalling and learning
in limit pricing game by Cooper et. al (1997). In the final part of this thesis, we
introduce ambiguity into an asymmetric information framework using a simplified
version of Milgrom and Roberts’ limit pricing model. We discuss the impact of
ambiguity in two cases of information asymmetry: in the first case, the incumbent
is fully informed of the true state of the market; in contrast, the potential entrant
is ambiguous about the state. In the second case, both players are uncertain about
the state, but the incumbent is deciding under risk while the entrant is deciding
under ambiguity. Because of information asymmetries, liit pricing appears under
some conditions. Under ambiguity, the entrant behaves more cautiously than in
the case under risk. Therefore, ambiguity decreases the probability of entry under
certain conditions.
7

Chapter 2
Two-player Trading Games in A
Stock Market with Incomplete
Information on One-and-a-half
Sides1
Abstract
Information asymmetries are well known in the financial markets. In this chapter,
we formulate two-player trading games with incomplete information on one-and-a-
half sides. Under this information structure, player 1 is informed of the true state
of the nature (the value of the risky asset) but is uncertain about player 2’s belief
about the state because player 2 is privately informed through a message related
to the state. In the N-stage repeated zero-sum game in a 2× 2 framework, player
1 does not benefit from his informational advantage unless the message M known
by player 2 and the true value L are independent. Therefore, the price dynamics
are completely different from those in De Meyer’s (2010) result by simply slightly
disturbing the information of the uninformed player. In a non-zero-sum game in
which player 2 is risk averse, player 1 can benefit from his informational advantage
under more relaxed conditions on the joint distribution of L and M .
1This chapter is joint work with Bernard De Meyer.
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WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION ON ONE-AND-A-HALF
SIDES
2.1 Introduction
In financial markets, it is well known that the institutional investors have better
access to market-relevant information than do private investors: the former are
better skilled at analysing the flow of information and in some cases are even
members of the board of directors of the firms of which they are trading shares. De
Meyer (2010) analysed the effects of information asymmetries on price dynamics.
Specifically, the market is represented by a repeated exchange game between an
informed sector (player 1) and an uninformed sector (player 2). In his model, both
players are exchanging one risky asset (R) using the nume´raire (N). An exogenous
random event determines the liquidation value L of the risky asset. L is thus a
random variable, and the players are assumed to have a common prior distribution
µ on L. Player 1 is assumed to be initially informed about L while player 2 is not.
During n consecutive periods, both players will exchange R for N using a “trading
mechanism” T : at stage q, the two players select an action, iq and jq, respectively,
and the resulting trade Tiq ,jq is performed. The aim of player 1 is to maximize the
expected liquidation value of his final portfolio. To represent a real-life exchange,
the trading mechanism has to satisfy certain axioms. In this case, the mechanism
is called a “natural exchange mechanism”. If the mechanism is natural, then,
asymptotically, as N goes to ∞, the price process will follow particular dynamics:
It will be a Continuous Martingale of Maximal Variation, (i.e., a martingale Pt
that can be written as Pt = f(Bt, t), where B is a Brownian motion, f is increasing
in B at a fixed t, and t = q
N
). The asymptotic price process is independent of the
“natural trading mechanism” used in each round.
De Meyer and Saley (2003) and De Meyer and Fournier (2015) are two additional
models with ideas similar to that of De Meyer (2010). One criticism of these previous
models is the information structure, whereby the informed player has full knowledge
of the beliefs of the uninformed player. This chapter represents the first attempt
to characterize a financial model out of this scenario. In our setting, player 1 is
informed of the value L of the risky asset, and player 2 is informed of some private
message M associated with L. Therefore, player 1 is uncertain about player 2’s
belief regarding the state of L. We have a game with incomplete information on
one-and-a-half sides, as introduced by Sorin and Zamir (1985).
In section 2.2, we introduce a 2× 2 benchmark model in which both L and M
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take two possible values. If both players are risk neutral, the N-stage repeated
zero-sum trading game between the two players proceeds as follows: In each stage,
player 1 decides to sell or buy one share of the risky asset at a price that is
simultaneously proposed by player 2. The choices are simultaneous, which at first
glance, seems surprising. Indeed, one usually assumes that the trader will buy or
sell after observing the market maker’s price. However, following the argument
in De Meyer and Fournier (2015), a sequential model in which player 1 reacts to
the price posted by player 2 is equivalent to our model. In the zero-sum in the
simultaneous game considered here, player 1’s payoff is linear in player 2’s choice
of price, therefore, the equilibrium strategy of player 2 is a pure strategy. Player
2’s move pq thus can be completely anticipated by player 1 in period q. Player 1
would obtain no benefit from observing pq before selecting uq, namely deciding
whether to buy or sell. In the non zero-sum game where player 2 is risk averse, due
to Jensen’s inequality, the equilibrium strategy of player 2 is also a pure strategy.
In section 2.3, we analyse two cases, and we obtain all of the results for the
2× 2 benchmark model. The first result is quite intuitive: if the message M and
the value L are independent, then player 2 clearly cannot induce any information
on the state L; therefore, player 1 can ignore the message of player 2. We are back
to the game with incomplete information on one side analysed by De Meyer (2010).
We know that in this case the value vN of the game is strictly positive except when
L is deterministic. Player 1 can benefit from his private information on the value
of the risky asset.
In the second case, M and L are not independent. Here, we surprisingly prove
that the value vN of the game is zero and there is no revelation by player 1. As a
function of a probability vector defined on the unit simplex ∆3, the value of the
game is not continuous. It is zero everywhere except on the manifold where L and
M are independent. For the N -stage repeated game, there is no optimal strategy
for player 2, but we can identify the −optimal strategy of player 2. In fact, in
each stage, player 2 plays optimally, but just introducing −perturbation such that
the posteriors of L and M are not independent. Since  is small enough, player 2
can guarantee a payoff of zero. Therefore, in the non-independent case, the value
of the game vN is zero, which means that player 1 does not benefit from his private
information. We can see that by just slightly disturbing the information of the
uninformed player, the posterior belief of player 2 is not known to player 1, the
11
2. TWO-PLAYER TRADING GAMES IN A STOCK MARKET
WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION ON ONE-AND-A-HALF
SIDES
price dynamics are nearly constant. This result is completely different from De
Meyer’s (2010).
In the N−stage repeated zero-sum game, in each stage, player 2 makes a lottery
involving two prices such that the conditional expectation of the price equals
the value L. Playing in this way entails a negative price, which is not a natural
interpretation in economics. However, we cannot impose a restriction requiring
a positive price because this would violate the invariance axiom of the natural
trading mechanism. That is, the value of the game must remain unchanged if one
shifts the liquidation value L by a constant amount. This result might be improved
in the event that player 2 is risk averse. Therefore, in section 2.4, we discuss a
non-zero-sum one-shot game in which player 2 is risk averse. In this setting, we
show that the value of the game is positive under more relaxed conditions on the
joint distribution of M and L. We conjecture that in a repeated game, player 2
cannot guarantee the value of the game to be zero by slightly modifying his optimal
strategy in each stage. Given the complexity of analysing the repeated game and
characterizing the price dynamics in this setting, we leave such work to further
research.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 introduces a 2 × 2 benchmark
model, in which the value L of the risky asset and the message M only take two
possible values. In section 2.3, we discuss the value of the one-stage game and
the N−stage repeated zero-sum game. Section 2.4 discusses one-stage games with
more general random variables representing M and L and a one-stage 2× 2 game
in which player 2 is risk averse. Section 2.5 provides the conclusion.
2.2 Description of the 2× 2 zero-sum game
In the game we consider, player 1 initially receives some private information
about the risky asset and player 2 receives some message M associated with this
information. This information will be publicly disclosed at a future date. At that
date, the value L of the risky asset will depend solely on the information initially
received by player 1. In the 2×2 framework, L ∈ {0, 1}, and M ∈ {a, b}. We denote
Prob(L = l ∩M = m) = µlm, Prob(M = m) = µm, for m ∈ {a, b}, Prob(L = l) =
µl, for l ∈ {0, 1}, and Prob(L = l|M = m) = µl|m, µ = (µ0|a, µ0|b, µa). We use
the method of Sorin and Zamir (1985) to define GN(µ), N ≥ 1 as the N−stage
12
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repeated zero-sum game in which the two players exchange the risky asset for a
nume´raire in each stage. For each µ0|a, µ0|b, µa ∈ [0, 1]3, the game is proceeded as
follows:
Step 00. Nature selects m ∈ {a, b} with Prob(m = a) = µa and this choice is
told to player 2 only.
Step 0. Nature selects l ∈ {0, 1} with Prob(l = 0) = µ0|m and this choice is
told to player 1 only.
Step 1. Player 1 decides to buy (u1 = 1) or sell (u1 = −1) one unit of the risky
asset. Then the action set of player 1 is uq ∈ {1,−1}. Simultaneously, player 2
selects a price p1 ∈ R for the transaction. Then this choice (u1, p1) is announced
to both players and the trade performed with this price.
Step q ∈ {2, ..., N} . In addition to their private information, both players
knowing the history of actions prior to round q, that is hq = (u1, p1; ...;uq, pq) ,
select some move and this pair (uq, pq) is announced to both players.
In this game, observing m, player 2 has a prior that L = 0 with probability
µ0|m. However, because player 1 can not observe m, player 1 does not observe the
prior of player 2 on the state L and is just aware of the probability distribution
of player 2’s prior. Let hq denote the history of actions prior to round q, that is
hq = (u1, p1; ...;uq, pq) with h0 = ∅, and Hq denote the set of all possible histories
until round q. A behavioural strategy of player 1 in this game is σ = (σ1, ...σN ) with
σq : (L, hq−1)→ ∆({1,−1}). A behavioural strategy of player 2 is τ = (τ1, ...τN)
with τq : (M,hq−1)→ ∆(R). Then, a triple (µ, σ, τ) induces a unique probability
distribution on (L,M,HN). When X is a random variable, we denote Eµ,σ,τ [X]
as the expectation of X with respect to this probability. We assume that both
players are risk neutral; then, the payoff of player 1 in this game is the expected
value of his final portfolio:
gN(µ, σ, τ) = Eµ,σ,τ
[
N∑
q=1
uq(L− pq)
]
. (2.1)
The payoff of player 2 is −gN (µ, σ.τ). To simplify notation, we denote the expecta-
tion Eµ,σ,τ by E.
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2.3 Main Results
2.3.1 One-shot game
To characterize the value vN of the N−stage repeated zero-sum game, we first
analyse the one-shot game. In the one-shot game, q = 1, the payoff function (2.1)
is simply the following:
g1(µ, σ.τ) = E[u(L− p)]
= Eµ[(2σ(L)− 1)(L− EτM (p))],
where σ(l) is the probability with which player 1 chooses u = 1 if L = l, for all
l ∈ {0, 1}. This equation shows that the pure strategy of player 2, p = (pa, pb),
where pm = Eτm(p), ∀m ∈ {a, b}, yields the same payoff as the mixed strategy τ
given player 1’s strategy σ. Player 1’s payoff function is linear in player 2’s choice
of price, and therefore player 1 cares about any random price choice by player 2
only through the mean price. Therefore, player 2 does not need to play mixed
strategies. Player 2 plays pa (resp. pb) with probability 1 if he is type M = a (resp.
M = b). Then we can rewrite the payoff function as follows:
g1(µ, σ.τ) = Eµ[(2σ(L)− 1)(L− EτM (p))]
= EE[(2σ(L)− 1)(L− pM)|L]
= E[(2σ(L)− 1)(L− E[pM |L])].
This payoff function involves the expectation of pM conditional on L, and thus, we
can analyse the equilibrium in two cases:
Case (i): L and M are independent.
If L and M are independent, then
g1(µ, σ.τ) = E[(2σ(L)− 1)(L− E[pM |L])]
= E[(2σ(L)− 1)(L− E[pM ])
= µ0P [1− 2σ(0)] + µ1(P − 1)[1− 2σ(1)],
where P = µapa + µbpb. The best response, σ
∗ = (σ(0)∗, σ(1)∗), of player 1 to a
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given strategy P ∗ of player 2 is
(σ(0)∗, σ(1)∗) =

(1, 1) if P ∗ < 0,
(0, 1) if 0 ≤ P ∗ < 1,
(0, 0) if P ∗ ≥ 1.
That is,
σ(l)∗ = 1{P ∗<l} + s1{P ∗=l} ∀s ∈ [0, 1], ∀l ∈ {0, 1}. (2.2)
Given the best response of player 1, the payoff function becomes
g1(µ, σ
∗, P ) =
∑
l∈{0,1}
µl(P − l)[1− 2(1{P ∗<l} + s1{P ∗=l})]
=
∑
l∈{0,1}
µl[1− 2(1{P ∗<l} + s1{P ∗=l})]P −
∑
l∈{0,1}
Lµl[1− 2(1{P ∗<l} + s1{P ∗=l})]
=
∑
l∈{0,1}
µl[1− 2(1{P ∗<l} + s1{P ∗=l})]P + µ1[2(1{P ∗<1} + s1{P ∗=1})− 1].
In equilibrium, we have the following condition:∑
l∈{0,1}
µl[1− 2(1{P ∗<l} + s1{P ∗=l})] = 0,
⇒E[1{P ∗<L}] + sE[1{P ∗=L})] = 1
2
.
(2.3)
Equation (2.3) implies that the equilibrium price P ∗ ≤ median(L). If L is not
degenerated to 1, then P ∗ < 1. Otherwise, if P ∗ = 1, we can always choose
s ∈ (1
2
, 1] such that 2s1{P ∗=1} − 1 > 0. Immediately, we can deduce that the value
of the game is positive, that is:
g1(σ
∗, P ∗) = µ1[2(1{P ∗<1} + s1{P ∗=1})− 1] > 0. (2.4)
Now, we can summarize this result in the following proposition:
Proposition 2.1. In the one-shot zero-sum game in the 2 × 2 framework, if L
and M are independent, then in equilibrium, the optimal strategy of player 1 is
given in equation (2.2), the optimal strategy of player 2 is given in equation (2.3),
and the value of the game is positive and given in (2.4).
Case (ii): L and M are not independent.
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We can easily show that player 1 can guarantee a payoff of zero by choosing
σ(l) = 1
2
, for all l ∈ {0, 1}. However, as
g1(µ, σ.τ) = E[(2σ(L)− 1)(L− E[pM |L])]
≤ E[|L− E[pM |L]|],
if player 2 can choose p∗ = (p∗a, p
∗
b), such that
E[p∗M |L] = L,
then player 2 also can guarantee a payoff of zero. In fact, if L and M are not
independent, then det(µ) 6= 0, and there exists an equilibrium price p∗ = (p∗a, p∗b)
satisfying the following conditions:
µ0ap
∗
a + µ0bp
∗
b = 0
µ1ap
∗
a + µ1bp
∗
b = µ1.
Solving these equations, we obtain
p∗a = −
µ1µ0b
det(µ)
, and p∗b =
µ1µ0a
det(µ)
. (2.5)
In this case, the value of the game is zero. The informed player 1 does not benefit
from his private information on the value of the asset.
Proposition 2.2. In the one-shot zero-sum game in the 2× 2 framework, if L and
M are not independent, then given a joint distribution µ, there exists an equilibrium
strategy pµ = (p
∗
µ(a), p
∗
µ(b)) of player 2 given by equation (2.5), and the value of
the game is zero.
2.3.2 N−stage repeated zero-sum game
With the preliminary results from the one-shot game, we proceed to analyse the
N−stage repeated game. In the one-shot game, the value of the game can be
explicitly written in the form
v1 = f(µ0a, µ0b, µ1a, µ1b),
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where ∑
l∈{0,1},m∈{a,b}
µlm = 1, µ = (µ0a, µ0b, µ1a, µ1b);
then, as a function of a probability vector µ defined in a unit simplex ∆3, the value
v1(µ) of the game is not continuous. It is zero everywhere except on the manifold
where det(µ) = 0. To obtain this result for the N−stage repeated zero-sum game,
we again consider two cases: (i). L and M are independent, and (ii). L and M are
not independent.
Case (i). L and M are independent.
We assume that µ1(h0) = µ; then, at each stage q ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}, a triple
(µ, σ, τ) induces a unique posterior joint distribution of (L,M). That is, at the end
of stage q, a history hq = (u1, p1; ...;uq, pq) is observed; then, in stage q + 1, the
joint posterior probability distribution of (L = l,M = m) given this history can be
computed recursively as follows:
µq+1lm (hq) = P(L = l,M = m|uq, pq, hq−1)
=
P(L = l,M = m,uq, pq|hq−1)P(hq−1)
P(hq)
=
P(hq−1)
P(hq)
P(uq|L = l, hq−1)P(pq|M = m,hq−1)P(L = l,M = m|hq−1)
=
P(hq−1)
P(hq)
σq(l, hq−1)(uq) · τq(m,hq−1)(pq) · µqlm(hq−1),
for all l ∈ {0, 1},m ∈ {a, b}. The third equality holds because uq and pq are
selected simultaneously by player 1 and player 2 in stage q. In the last equation,
the notations denote that, in stage q, conditional on the history path hq−1, type
l of player 1 chooses uq with probability σq(l, hq−1)(uq) , and type m of player
2 chooses price pq with probability τq(m,hq−1)(pq). Then, we have the following
property:
Proposition 2.3. Let µ1(h0) = µ; at the end of stage q, where q ∈ {1, ...N − 1},
a history hq = (u1, p1; ...;uq, pq) is observed. Then the posterior of the joint
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distribution µq+1(hq) can be computed recursively as follows:
µq+1(hq) =
P(hq−1)
P(hq)
(
σq(0, hq−1)(uq) 0
0 σq(1, hq−1)(uq)
)
µq
(
τ q(a, hq−1)(pq) 0
0 τ q(b, hq−1)(pq)
)
(2.6)
Proposition 2.4. In this 2× 2 framework, if L and M are independent, then for
all q ∈ {1, ...N}, the posteriors are also independent.
Proof. From proposition 2.3, we know that for all q ∈ {1, ..., N − 1},
det(µq+1) =
[P(hq−1)]2 det(µq)
[P(hq)]2
∏
l∈{0,1}
σq(l, hq−1)(uq)
∏
m∈{a,b}
τ q(m,hq−1)(pq).
Since both L and M only take two values, the independence assumption between L
and M is equivalent to det(µ1) = 0. The equation above implies that det(µq) = 0,
for all q ∈ {1, ..., N}. That is, all the posteriors of L and M are independent. 
In this case, the N-stage repeated zero-sum game with incomplete information
on one-and-a-half sides coincides with the repeated zero-sum game with incomplete
information on one side discussed in De Meyer (2010).
Case (ii). L and M are not independent.
First, we claim that player 1 can guarantee a zero payoff.
Lemma 2.1. In the N-stage repeated zero-sum game in the 2× 2 framework, if L
and M are not independent, then vN ≥ 0.
Proof. Consider the following strategy of player 1:
σ˜ = (σ˜1, ..., σ˜N), where σ˜q(l) =
1
2
, ∀l ∈ {0, 1}, ∀q ∈ {1, ..., N}.
Using σ˜, the payoff g1(µ, σ˜, τ) of player 1 is zero regardless of the strategy of player
2. Therefore,
vN = max
σ
min
τ
g1(σ, τ) ≥ min
τ
g1(σ˜, τ) = 0.

Second, let us prove that player 2 can guarantee a payoff of zero, that is
vN ≤ 0. To obtain this result, we need the following preliminary knowledge. From
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the posterior joint distribution of (L,M) given by equation (2.6), at stage q + 1,
q ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}, we compute the conditional distribution of M given L and the
past path hq as follows:
P(M = m|L = l, hq) = P(M = m,L = l, hq)∑
m′∈{a,b}
P(M = m′, L = l, hq)
=
P(hq|M = m,L = l)µlm∑
m′∈{a,b}
P(hq|M = m′, L = l)µlm′
=
q∏
k=1
σk(l, hk−1)(uk)
q∏
k=1
τ k(m,hk−1)(pk)µlm∑
m′∈{a,b}
q∏
k=1
σk(l, hk−1)(uk)
q∏
k=1
τ k(m′, hk−1)(pk)µlm′
=
q∏
k=1
τ k(m,hk−1)(pk)µlm∑
m′∈{a,b}
q∏
k=1
τ k(m′hk−1)(pk)µlm′
.
(2.7)
Again, the third equality holds because, in each stage, player 1 and player 2 make
moves simultaneously. This equation means that the posterior of M conditional
on (L, hq) does not depend on the behavioural strategy σ of player 1. This implies
that in each stage, player 1’s past strategies do not influence his current strategy.
As in the one shot-game, we analogously rewrite the payoff of player 1 as
follows:
gN(µ, σ, τ) = Eµ,σ,τ
[
N∑
q=1
uq(L− pq)
]
=
N∑
q=1
E [E [uq(L− pq)|L, hq−1]]
=
N∑
q=1
E[E[uq|L, hq−1](L− E[pq|L, hq−1])]
=
N∑
q=1
E[(2σq(L, hq−1)(1)− 1)(L− E[pq|L, hq−1])]
≤
N∑
q=1
E|L− E[pq|L, hq−1]|.
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If there exists price (p∗q(a), p
∗
q(b)) for each q ∈ {1, ..., N}, such that
E[p∗q|L, hq−1] = L,
that is, for each q, (p∗q(a), p
∗
q(b)) solves the equations
p∗q(a)P(M = a|L = 0, hq−1) + p∗q(b)P(M = b|L = 0, hq−1) = 0,
p∗q(a)P(M = a|L = 1, hq−1) + p∗q(b)P(M = b|L = 1, hq−1) = 1,
(2.8)
then the payoff of player 1 is equal to or less than zero. Since we have shown that
the posterior of M conditional on (L, hq−1) does not depend on the behavioural
strategy σ of player 1, the solution p∗q(a) and p
∗
q(b) of (2.8) does not depend on σ.
Now we are prepared to prove the following lemma:
Lemma 2.2. In the 2× 2 N-stage repeated zero-sum game, if L and M are not
independent, then vN ≤ 0.
Proof. To prove this lemma, recall that in the one-shot 2×2 zero-sum game, player
2 plays a pure strategy p∗µ as given in proposition 2.2. For a given µ, let us define a
perturbed strategy γµ,η = (γµ,ηa , γ
µ,η
b ) of player 2 as follows: For a given η > 0, for
some  strictly positive to be defined later, this strategy consists in playing p∗µ(a)
with probability 1−  and p∗µ(b) with probability  when he is type a; otherwise, it
consists in playing p∗µ(b) with probability 1−  and p∗µ(a) with probability  when
he is type b, that is
γµ,ηa (p
∗
µ(a)) = 1− , γµ,ηa (p∗µ(b)) = ,
γµ,ηb (p
∗
µ(b)) = 1− , γµ,ηb (p∗µ(a)) = .
In the one-shot game, this strategy guarantees that player 1’s payoff is very
small, regardless of his strategy σ, and we obtain
g1(µ, σ, γ
µ,η) = g1(σ, p
∗
µ) + K(µ),
= K(µ),
where
K(µ) =
µ0µ1
det(µ)
∑
l∈{0,1}
[1− 2σ(l)][µla − µlb].
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Note that K(µ) ≤
∣∣∣ 2µ0µ1det(µ) ∣∣∣ . We then define  = η| 2µ0µ1det(µ) | . Therefore, this perturbed
strategy γµ,η of player 2 can guarantee that g1(µ, σ, γ
µ,η) ≤ η regardless of the
strategy of player 1.
With this definition of strategy γµ,η in mind, we are prepared to prove this
lemma. Since L and M are not independent, det(µ) 6= 0. Let us consider the
following strategy τ of player 2: In stage 1, he plays γµ,η, and for the following
stages, q ∈ {2, ..., N}, he first computes the conditional posterior µq(M |L, hq−1) of
M conditional on (L, hq−1) as given in (2.7), which does not depend on the strategy
of player 1, as we discussed above. When det(µq) 6= 0, he plays γµq ,η. However, if
det(µq) = 0, let us consider the first-stage q0 ≥ 2 such that at this stage,
det(µq0) =
[P(hq0−2)]2 det(µq0−1)
[P(hq0−1)]2
∏
l∈{0,1}
σq0(l, hq0−1)(uq0)
∏
m∈{a,b}
τ q0(m,hq0−1)(pq0) = 0.
Since in stage q0, player 2 plays τq0 6= 0, the only possibility is that
σq(l, hq0−1)(uq0) = 0, for some l ∈ {0, 1}.
In other words, in this stage, observing uq0 , player 2 can deduce the state of L.
Since he knows the value of L, he plays L until the end of the game. Clearly, this
strategy yields the following payoff to player 1:
gN(µ, σ, γ
η) =
N∑
q=1
g1(µ
q, σq, τ) ≤ Nη
Since η is arbitrary small, there is no strategy of player 1 that can guarantee
a strictly positive payoff. In each stage q ≥ 2, player 2 simply introduces an
−perturbation of his optimal strategy p∗q(a) and p∗q(b), which is the solution of Eq.
(2.8), such that M and L are not independent, and the choices of p∗q(a) and p
∗
q(b)
for all q ∈ {2, ..., N} do not depend on the strategy σ of player 1, this strategy of
player 2 can guarantee a payoff of zero. 
Combining Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 2.2 implies the following theorem:
Theorem 2.1. In the 2× 2 N-stage repeated zero-sum game, if L and M are not
independent, then the value vN of the game is zero.
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2.4 Discussion
2.4.1 A general one-shot zero-sum game
In the previous sections, we analysed a simple 2 × 2 benchmark model, and we
showed that, in the N -period repeated zero-sum trading game, the more informed
player cannot exploit his private information unless the message M and the value
L are independent. A natural extension of this model is to examine the case in
which both L and M can take more possible values on R. With the same argument
as for the one-shot game in the 2× 2 framework, when L and M are independent,
the value v1 of the game is still positive in the general framework. However, for
the case in which L and M are not independent, the condition,
L = E[p∗(M)|L)] a.s . (2.9)
to guarantee a zero payoff for player 2 may not always hold. If there exists
p∗(M) such that condition (2.9) holds true, then the value v1 of the game is zero.
Otherwise, v1 is strictly positive. Therefore condition (2.9) is critical to guarantee
a zero payoff.
Example 1. Assume that M is a mean-preserving spread of L, i.e., M = L+ ε,
where ε ∼ N(0, σ2),  and L are independent. It is easy to show that the price
p∗(M) = M can satisfy condition (2.9).
Example 2. Assume the joint density function of (L,M) is
f(l,m) =
{
2, if 0 ≤ l ≤ 1, l ≤ m ≤ 1
0, otherwise.
By solving the condition (2.9) as∫ 1
l
p(m)
1− l dm = l,
⇒
∫ 1
l
p(m)dm = l(1− l).
(2.10)
we can obtain the equilibrium price p∗(M) = 2M − 1. In these two examples, L
and M are not independent, and the value of the game is zero in both examples.
However, condition (2.9) does not hold true under the following conditions:
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(i). If both L and M are continuous variables, then the value of M is known
whenever L is known but not vice versa, for example M = L2.
(ii). If both L and M are discrete variables with a joint distribution µ, then
rank(µ) < #(L), where #(L) is the cardinality of the set of alternatives of L.
Example 3. Let us consider the following example in which the joint distribution
µ of L and M is as given in table 2.2. In this example, there clearly is no p = (pa, pb)
Table 2.1: Joint distribution µ of (L, M)
M=a M= b
L = 0 1
6
1
6
L = 1 1
6
1
6
L = 2 0 1
3
such that
E(p(M |L = 0)) = pa + pb
2
= 0,
E(p(M |L = 1)) = pa + pb
2
= 1,
E(p(M |L = 2)) = 2− pb = 2.
We can compute that the optimal strategy of player 1 is
σ∗ = (σ∗(0), σ∗(1), σ∗(2)) = (0, 1,
1
2
),
and the optimal strategy of player 2 is
p∗ = (p∗a, p
∗
b) = (−2, 2).
The value of the game is v = 1
3
> 0.
To summarize the argument above, we conclude that in the general one-shot
zero-sum game, if L and M are independent, then the value of the game v1 > 0. If
L and M are not independent and there exists p∗ satisfying condition (2.9), then
the value of the game v1 = 0; otherwise, v1 > 0.
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2.4.2 One-shot non zero-sum game
The value of the game is discontinuous in the models discussed in the 2×2 framework
under the assumption that player 2 is risk neutral. Under this assumption, player
2 is indifferent between zero and a lottery with zero expectation. Therefore, he
can bear very high risk to drag the value down to zero. In the N−stage repeated
zero-sum game, in each stage, player 2 constructs a lottery between two prices
such that the conditional expectation of the price equals the value of L. Playing in
this way allows a negative price, which is not a natural interpretation in economics.
However, we cannot impose the restriction of a positive price because doing so
would violate the invariance axiom of the natural trading mechanism. That is, the
value of the game must remain unchanged if one shifts the liquidation value L by
a constant amount. This result might be improved upon if player 2 is risk averse.
To obtain an intuitive explanation, we consider a non-zero-sum one shot game in
which player 2 is risk averse.
In this setting, player 2’s risk-aversion preference is represented by a von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, E[H(x)], where H is concave and increasing.
We denote the expected payoff of player i as gi(µ, σ, τ), i ∈ {1, 2}. Since player 1
is risk neutral, g1(µ, σ, τ) has the same expression as we discussed in the previous
sections. The expected payoff of player 2, g2(µ, σ, τ), becomes
g2(µ, σ, τ) = E[H(u(L− p))]
= E[σ(L)Eτm [H(p− L)] + (1− σ(L))Eτm [H(L− p)]].
Since H is a concave function, Jensen’s inequality implies that
g2(µ, σ, τ) ≤ E[σ(L)H(Eτm [p]− L) + (1− σ(L))H(L− Eτm [p])].
Therefore, the pure strategy p = (pa, pb) yields a payoff for player 2 that is at least
as the same as a mixed strategy, where pa = Eτa(p) and pb = Eτb(p). Therefore,
the optimal strategies of player 2 are pure strategies, and the payoff given a pure
strategy p = (pa, pb) is
g2µ(σ, p) = Eµ[σ(L)H(E[p(M)]− L) + (1− σ(L))H(L− E[p(M)])]. (2.11)
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To analyse the equilibrium of the game, we assume that
H(x) = x− e−x, x ∈ R; (2.12)
then,
H ′(x) = 1 + e−x > 0, lim
x→+∞
H(x) = +∞,
H ′′(x) = −e−x < 0, lim
x→−∞
H(x) = −∞.
Without loss of generality, we assume that µ0 = µ1 =
1
2
in the 2× 2 framework.
First, we attempt to identify the conditions such that, in equilibrium, player 1
completely reveals his information; that is, he sells the risky asset when L = 0 and
buys when L = 1. In such an equilibrium, the value v1 of the game is positive.
Definition 2.1. A Nash equilibrium (σ∗, p∗) is called a revealing equilibrium
if (σ(0)∗, σ(1)∗) = (0, 1).
In this case, the expected payoff of player 2 is
g2(µ, (0, 1), (pa, pb)) = µ0aH(−pa) + µ0bH(−pb) + µ1aH(pa − 1) + µ1bH(pb − 1).
The strategy of player 2, (p∗a, p
∗
b), maximizing g
2(µ, (0, 1), (pa, pb)) solves the fol-
lowing first-order conditions:
∂g2µ
∂pa
= −µ0aH ′(−pa) + µ1aH ′(pa − 1) = 0,
∂g2µ
∂pb
= −µ0bH ′(−pb) + µ1bH ′(pb − 1) = 0.
(2.13)
By substituting H ′(x) = 1 + e−x into Eq. (2.13), we obtain p∗a = p
∗
a(pi0, pi1), p
∗
b =
p∗b(pi0, pi1), where pi0 = P(M = a|L = 0), and pi1 = P(M = a|L = 1). In a
revealing equilibrium, (σ(0)∗, σ(1)∗) = (0, 1) is also the best reply by player 1 to
the strategy (p∗a, p
∗
b) of player 2. The payoff function of player 1 does not change;
therefore, if (σ(0)∗, σ(1)∗) = (0, 1) is the best response of player 1 to a given
strategy p∗ = (p∗a, p
∗
b) of player 2, and the following conditions hold:
E[p∗(M)|L = 0] = pi0p∗a + (1− pi0)p∗b > 0,
E[p∗(M)|L = 1] = pi1p∗a + (1− pi1)p∗b < 1.
(2.14)
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Jointly solving inequalities (2.14) and (2.13),we find the area on the space of (pi0, pi1)
where the revealing equilibrium ((σ(0)∗, σ(1)∗), (p∗a, p
∗
b)) = ((0, 1), (p
∗
a(pi0, pi1), p
∗
b(pi0, pi1)))
exists (the middle-area in fig 1. (a)). It is easy to verify that the expected payoff
of player 1 is strictly positive in a revealing equilibrium.
Definition 2.2. A Nash equilibrium (σ∗, p∗) is called an equalizing equilibrium if
σ(l)∗ = s ∈ [0, 1] for l ∈ {0, 1}.
In an equalizing equilibrium, both types of player 1 are indifferent between
revealing and not revealing information. In this case, the optimal strategy of player
1 is any value between 0 and 1. An equalizing equilibrium, ((σ(0)∗, σ(1)∗), (p∗a, p
∗
b)),
satisfies the following conditions:
g2µ((σ(0)
∗, σ(1)∗), (p∗a, p
∗
b)) ≥ g2µ((σ(0)∗, σ(1)∗), (pa, pb)), ∀pa, pb ∈ R,
E[p∗(M)|L] = L.
Then, (σ(0)∗, σ(1)∗, (p∗a, p
∗
b)) solves the following system of equations:
pi0σ(0)
∗(1 + e−p
∗
a)− pi0(1− σ(0)∗)(1 + ep∗a) + pi1σ(1)∗(1 + e1−p∗a)−
pi1(1− σ(1)∗)(1 + ep∗a−1) = 0,
(1− pi0)σ(0)∗(1 + e−p∗b )− (1− pi0)(1− σ(0)∗)(1 + ep∗b )+
(1− pi1)σ(1)∗(1 + e1−p∗b )− (1− pi1)(1− σ(1)∗)(1 + ep∗b−1) = 0,
pi0p
∗
a + (1− pi0)p∗b = 0,
pi1p
∗
a + (1− pi1)p∗b = 1.
(2.15)
The first two equations are the first-order conditions for maximizing player 2’s
expected payoff. The last two equations satisfy condition (2.9). Solving this system
with constraints σ(0)∗ ∈ [0, 1], and σ(1)∗ ∈ [0, 1], we can find the area on the space
of (pi0, pi1) where the equalizing equilibrium exists (the two edge areas in fig 1. (b)).
The expected payoff of player 1 is zero in the equalizing equilibrium. From the
picture, we can see that player 1 can exploit his private information under a more
relaxed condition on the joint distribution relative to the risk-neutral environment.
In that case, the value of the game is positive only if pi0 = pi1. Player 2 cannot
guarantee a zero payoff to player 1 by simply slightly perturbing his optimal choice,
as is true in risk-neutral case. Therefore, we cannot use the same argument to
characterize the price dynamics in an N−stage repeated game. The price dynamics
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may be different.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we present two-player trading games with incomplete information
on one-and-a-half sides. For risk-neutral players, the more informed player can
only exploit his informational advantage when the value of the risky asset and
the message known by his trading partner are independent. By contrast, he can
benefit from his informational advantage under more relaxed conditions on the
joint distribution when his trading partner is risk averse. However, we obtain these
conclusions for finite-stage trading games based on a special trading mechanism;
that is, both players are forced to trade by buying or selling one share of the risky
asset. Further studies of trading behaviour and asymptotic price dynamics in a
general natural trading mechanism are encouraged.
27
2. TWO-PLAYER TRADING GAMES IN A STOCK MARKET
WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION ON ONE-AND-A-HALF
SIDES
(a)
(b)
Figure 2.1
28
Chapter 3
Hypothesis Testing Equilibrium
in Signalling Games1
Abstract
In this chapter, we propose a definition of Hypothesis Testing Equilibrium
(HTE) for general signalling games with non-Bayesian players nested by an updating
rule according to the Hypothesis Testing model characterized by Ortoleva (2012).
An HTE may differ from a sequential Nash equilibrium because of dynamic
inconsistency. However, in the case in which player 2 only treats a zero-probability
message as an unexpected news, an HTE is a refinement of sequential Nash
equilibrium and survives the Intuitive Criterion in general signalling games but not
vice versa. We provide an existence theorem covering a broad class of signalling
games often studied in economics, and the completely separating constrained
HTE is unique in such signalling games. We also present the results according to
Milgrom-Roberts’ (1982) model of limit pricing and obtain a unique HTE for each
interesting case.
Keywords: Signalling Games, Hypothesis Testing Equilibrium, Equilibrium
Refinement.
1Part of this chapter was published in IMW working papers series
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3.1 Introduction
Ortoleva (2012) models an agent who does not update according to Bayes’ rule
but instead “rationally” chooses a new prior among a set of priors when her
original prior assigns a small probability to a realized event. He provides axiomatic
foundations for his model in the form of a Hypothesis Testing representation
theorem for suitably defined preferences. Both the testing threshold and the set of
priors are subjective; therefore, an agent who follows this updating rule is aware of
and can anticipate her updating behaviour when formulating plans.
Specifically, we consider the preferences of an agent over acts F that are
functions from state space Ω to a set of consequences X. If the preference relation is
characterized by Dynamic Coherence in conjunction with other standard postulates,
then the agent’s behaviour can be represented by a Hypothesis Testing model
(u, ρ, ). According to this representation, the agent has a utility function u over
consequences; a prior over priors ρ; and a threshold  ∈ [0, 1). She then acts as
follows: Before any information arrives, she has a set of priors Π with probability
assessment ρ over Π. She chooses piΩ as her original prior, which is assigned the
highest probability by ρ among all pi ∈ supp(ρ). Then, she forms her preference
as the standard expected utility maximizer. As new information (an event) A
is revealed, the agent evaluates the probability of the occurrence of the event as
piΩ(A). She retains her original prior piΩ and proceeds with Bayesian updating on
piΩ using A if the event A is anticipated, i.e., piΩ(A) > . However, if piΩ(A) ≤ , she
rejects her original prior piΩ and searches for a new prior pi
∗ among supp(ρ) such
that pi∗ is the most likely one conditional on event A, that is, pi∗ = argmax
pi∈supp(ρ)
P(pi|A),
where
P(pi|A) = P(A|pi)P(pi)∫
pi′∈supp(ρ) P(A|pi′)P(pi′)dpi′
=
pi(A)ρ(pi)∫
pi′∈supp(ρ) pi
′(A)ρ(pi′)dpi′
.
(3.1)
Using this pi∗, she proceeds with Bayesian updating and forms her preference by
maximizing expected utility.
Ortoleva (2012) applied his model in the “Beer-Quiche” game and defined a
Hypothesis Testing Equilibrium (HTE) when  = 0 for this specific game. In this
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game, there exists a unique HTE that coincides with the selection of the Intuitive
Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987). This chapter develops the idea of nesting this
updating model in general signalling games with finite states and proposes a general
concept of HTE. In the general definition of HTE, we allow the testing threshold
 ≥ 0. If player 2 has a testing threshold  > 0, then she changes her original belief
when a small (but non-zero) probability event occurs. This dynamic inconsistency
leads to the result that an HTE may deviate from sequential Nash equilibrium.
However, we show that when  = 0, an HTE is a refinement of sequential Nash
equilibria. In this case, player 2 only considers the zero-probability event as an
unexpected event. To compare our approach with other refinement criteria, we
focus primarily on the properties of this class of HTE. We have three main findings:
(a). As a method of refinement, an HTE survives the Intuitive Criterion in general
signalling games, but not vice versa. (b). A general HTE exists in a broad class
of signalling games that is widely utilized in economics and satisfies the Single
Crossing Property together with other standard assumptions. (c). We propose a
concept of constrained HTE in which the set of alternative beliefs of player 2 is
restricted to be around her original belief. We show that the constrained HTE is
unique if only completely separating equilibria exist. As an example, we present
these results in Milgrom-Roberts’ limit pricing model and obtain a unique HTE
for each interesting case.
This chapter focuses on signalling games, a class of games in which an informed
player (player 1) conveys private information to an uninformed player (player
2) through messages, and player 2 attempts to make inferences about hidden
information and takes an action that can influence both players’ payoffs. There
is an enormous literature that analyses and utilizes signalling games in a wide
range of economic problems, as reviewed in Riley (2001) and Sobel (2007); see
also Spence’s model of the labor market (Spence, 1974), Milgrom-Roberts’ model
of limit pricing (Milgrom and Roberts, 1982), bargaining models (Fudenberg and
Tirole, 1983 ), and models in finance (Brealey, et. al, 1977), for example. Typically,
a signalling game gives rise to many sequential Nash equilibria (Kreps and Wilson,
1982) because, under the assumption of Bayesian updating, in equilibrium, there
are no other restrictions on the message m that is sent with zero probability by
player 1 except that player 2’s responses to m can be rationalized by some belief
held by player 2. Therefore, the natural approach to refining sequential Nash
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equilibria is to impose additional restrictions on the out-of-equilibrium beliefs, as
we can see in the literature reviewed in Govindan and Wilson (2008, 2009), Hillas
and Kohlberg (2002), Kohlberg (1990), and van Damme (2002).
One branch of the refinement criteria, which has been widely applied in signalling
games, is motivated by the concept of strategic stability for finite games addressed
by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). The Intuitive Criterion, D1 and D2 Criteria (Cho
and Kreps, 1987), and Divinity (Banks and Sobel, 1987), for example, are all weaker
versions of strategic stability that are defined more easily for signalling games. These
refinements interpret the meaning of the out-of-equilibrium messages depending
on the current equilibrium, meaning that, in a reasonable equilibrium, sending an
out-of-equilibrium message is costly and unattractive to player 1. There is also a
branch of refinements that are intended to define a new concept of equilibrium, for
example, the perfect sequential equilibria proposed by Grossman and Perry (1986),
different versions of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) discussed by Fudenburg
and Tirole (1991), and forward induction equilibrium defined by Govindan and
Wilsons (2009) and modified by Man (2012), the consistent forward induction
equilibrium path proposed by Umbauer (1991), the undefeated equilibrium of
Mailath, et. al, (1993), and some methods of equilibrium selection in cheap talk
game by Matthews et. al (1991) and de Groot Ruiz and Offerman (2012).There
is no consensus in the literature that one refinement is better than another. One
refinement can be favourable in certain settings but unfavourable in other settings.
All of the refinements mentioned above concern signalling games with Bayesian
players. However, behaviour deviating from Bayesian updating has been observed
by psychologists,2 and these experiments have motivated increasing interest in
studies on non-Bayesian updating; see, for example, the model of temptation
and self-control proposed by Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, 2004) characterized
axiomatically by Epstein (2006) and extended by Epstein et al., (2008, 2010),
models of learning in social networks developed by Golub and Jackson (2010)
and Jadbabaie et al., (2012), the arguments from rational beliefs advanced by
Gilboa et. al, (2008, 2009, 2012) and Teng (2014), and the Hypothesis Testing
model of Ortoleva (2012). In signalling games with non-Bayesian players, this
chapter proposes a concept of HTE and provides a refinement based on the idea of
2For example, see Tversky and Kahneman (1974), Camerer (1995), Rabin (1998, 2002), and
Mullainathan (2000).
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non-Bayesian reactions to low-probability messages according to the Hypothesis
Testing model.
The non-Bayesian updating rule is nested in signalling games as follows: Before
player 1 moves, player 2 has a prior over a (finite) set of strategies that player 1
may use, and she determines the strategy that she believes player 1 will use most
likely, which induces her original belief. After she observes a message sent by player
1, she evaluates the probability of the observed message using her original belief.
She retains her original belief and uses it to proceed with Bayesian updating if
the probability of the message she observed is greater than her testing threshold.
However, if the probability is less than or equal to her threshold, she discards her
original belief (she believes that player 1 may use a strategy other than her original
conjecture). She then searches for a new belief that can be induced by another
“rational” strategy by player 1 such that it is the most likely strategy conditional
on the observed message. In a Hypothesis Testing equilibrium, the strategy of
player 1 that induces player 2’s original belief coincides with the strategy that
player 1 actually uses. The difficulty concerns how to construct the set of player
2’s beliefs and how to assign a prior over the set of possible strategies. We first
follow the idea of Ortoleva (2012) and allow all beliefs that can be “rationalized”
by at least one strategy of player 2, which is a weak restriction on the beliefs
available to player 2. Then, we propose the constrained HTE in which only those
beliefs around her original belief are under consideration. When player 2 observes
a zero-probability message under her original belief, she looks for the most likely
types who are willing to send this message, and she modifies her belief only by
revising her original belief according to this message.
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly recall the
basic concepts and definitions from Ortoleva (2012) on the updating rule of the
Hypothesis Testing model and the framework of general signalling games. Section
3.3 defines the general HTE and discusses its main properties. Section 3.4 proves
the existence and uniqueness theorems. Section 3.5 compares the refinements
of the constrained HTE and Intuitive Criterion. Section 3.5 analyses the HTE
of Milgrom-Roberts’ limit pricing model in a finite framework, and section 3.7
provides the conclusion and some remarks.
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3.2 Formulations and preliminaries
3.2.1 The updating rule of Hypothesis Testing Model
First, we recall the basic concepts, definitions and main results of the Hypothesis
Testing model in general decision theory. Adopting the notations in Ortoleva
(2012), consider a probability space (Ω,Σ,∆(Ω)), where Ω is a finite (nonempty)
state space, Σ is set of all subsets of Ω, and ∆(Ω) is the set of all probability
measures (beliefs) on Ω. Write ∆(∆(Ω)) as the set of all beliefs over beliefs. Let
BU(pi,A)(B) =
pi(A ∩B)
pi(A)
denote the Bayesian update of pi ∈ ∆(Ω) using A ∈ Σ if pi(A) > 0. As discussed in
the introduction, equation (3.1) provides the Bayesian update of the second-order
prior ρ ∈ ∆(∆(Ω)) using A ∈ Σ if pi(A) > 0 for some pi ∈ supp(ρ). We denote it
as follows:
BU(ρ,A)(pi) :=
pi(A)ρ(pi)∫
∆(Ω)
pi′(A)ρ(pi′)dpi′
.
Let us consider the preferences of an agent over acts F, which are functions from
state space Ω to a set of consequences X. For example, X could be a set of possible
prizes that depend on the realizations of the state.
Definition 3.1. (Ortoleva, 2012) A class of preference relations {A}A∈Σ admits
a Hypothesis Testing representation if there exists a nonconstant affine function
u : X → R, a prior over priors ρ ∈ ∆(∆(Ω)) with finite support, and  ∈ [0, 1)
such that, for any A ∈ Σ, there exists piA ∈ ∆(Ω) such that
(i) for any f, g ∈ F
f A g ⇔
∑
ω∈Ω
piA(ω)u(f(ω)) ≥
∑
ω∈Ω
piA(ω)u(g(ω))
(ii) {piΩ} = argmax
pi∈∆(Ω)
ρ(pi)
(iii)
piA =
BU(piΩ, A) piΩ(A) > BU(pi∗A, A) otherwise,
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where {pi∗A} = argmax
pi∈∆(Ω)
BU(ρ,A)(pi).
Under this definition, if a decision maker’s preference is represented by the
updating rule according to the Hypothesis Testing model, then she proceeds with
updating according to the following procedure:
Step 0. The agent is uncertain about some important state of the nature. Instead
of a single subjective probability distribution over the alternative possibilities, she
has a set of probability distributions (priors) Π and a probability distribution
(second-order prior) ρ on Π, and supp(ρ) 6= ∅. The agent has a subjective threshold
 for hypothesis testing.
Step 1. Before any new information is revealed, the agent chooses a prior
piΩ ∈ supp(ρ) that is the most likely prior according to her belief ρ. In this
hypothesis test, piΩ serves as a null hypothesis and all the other priors pi ∈ supp(ρ)
serve as alternative hypotheses.
Step 2. As new information (an event) A is revealed, the agent evaluates the
probability of the occurrence of A as piΩ(A). The null hypothesis will not be
rejected if piΩ(A) > , and the agent can proceed to apply Bayes’ rule to the prior
piΩ. However, the null hypothesis will be rejected if piΩ(A) ≤ . The agent doubts
her original prior piΩ because an unexpected event occurred. The agent will choose
an alternative prior pi∗ ∈ supp(ρ) that is the most likely prior conditional on the
event A. Then she proceeds with Bayes’ rule on the prior pi∗. When  > 0, we have
non-Bayesian updating and dynamic consistency is violated up to . When  = 0,
the dynamic consistency condition holds and the posteriors are also well defined
after zero-probability events.
The aim of this chapter is to nest the non-Bayesian updating rule according
to the Hypothesis Testing model in signalling games; therefore, we now briefly
introduce the general framework of signalling games with Bayesian players.
3.2.2 Signalling games
Nature selects the type of player 1 according to some probability distribution µ
over a finite set T with supp(µ) 6= ∅ (for simplicity, we take T = supp(µ)). Player
1 is informed of his type t ∈ T , but player 2 is not. After player 1 has learnt his
type, he chooses to send a message m from a finite set M . Observing the message
m, player 2 updates his belief on the types of player 1 and selects a response
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r in a finite action set R. The game ends with this response, and payoffs are
made to the two players. The payoff to player i, i = 1, 2, is given by a function
ui : T ×M × R → R. The distribution µ and the description of the game are
common knowledge.
A behavioural strategy of player 1 is a function σ : T → ∆(M) such that∑
m∈M σ(m; t) = 1 for all t ∈ T . Type t of player 1 chooses to send message m
with probability σ(m; t) for all t ∈ T . A behavioural strategy of player 2 is a
function τ : M → ∆(R) such that ∑r∈R τ(r;m) = 1 for all m ∈M . Player 2 plays
a response r to the message m with probability τ(r;m). We adopt the notations in
Cho and Kreps (1978) and write BR(m,µ) for the set of best responses of player 2
after observing m if she has posterior belief µ(·|m).
BR(m,µ) = argmax
r∈R
∑
t∈T
u2(t,m, r)µ(t|m).
If T ′ ⊆ T , let BR(T ′,m) denote the set of best responses of player 2 to posteriors
concentrated on the set T ′. That is,
BR(T ′,m) =
⋃
{µ:µ(T ′|m)=1}
BR(m,µ).
Let BR(T ′,m, µ) be the set of best responses of player 2 to the observed message
m if she has posterior belief µ(·|m) concentrated on the subset T ′, and let MBR
denote the set of mixed best responses of player 2. Since we concentrate on the
finite sets of T , M , and R, the sequential Nash equilibrium can be straightforwardly
defined.
Proposition 3.1. A profile of players’ behavioural strategies (σ∗, τ ∗) forms a
sequential Nash equilibrium (SNE) in a finite signalling game if it satisfies the
following conditions:
(i) Given player 2’s strategy τ ∗, each type t evaluates the expected utility from
sending message m as
∑
r∈R u1(t,m, r)τ
∗(r;m) and σ∗(·; t) assigns a weight to m
only if it is among the maximizing ms in this expected utility.
(ii) Given player 1’s strategy σ∗, for all m that are sent by some type t with
positive probability µ(t|m) > 0 , every response r ∈ R such that τ ∗(r;m) > 0 must
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be a best response to m given belief µ(t|m); that is,
τ ∗(·;m) ∈ MBR(m,µ(·|m)), (3.2)
where µ(t|m) = σ∗(m;t)µ(t)∑
t′∈T σ∗(m;t′)µ(t′)
.
(iii) For every message m that is sent with zero probability by player 1 (for
all m such that
∑
t σ
∗(m; t)µ(t) = 0), there must be some probability distribution
µ(·|m) over types T such that (3.2) holds.
In an SNE, given the strategy of player 1, player 2 proceeds in three steps: she
computes the probability of an observed message m as P(m) =
∑
t∈T σ
∗(m; t)µ(t).
If P(m) > 0, that is, there exists some t ∈ T , such that σ∗(m; t) > 0, then she uses
Bayes’ rule to compute the posterior assessment µ(·|m), and she then chooses her
best response to m compatible with her belief µ(·|m). If P(m) = 0, then the only
requirement is that there exists some belief µ(·|m) such that her response to the
out-of-equilibrium message is rational.
What happens if player 2’s reactions to a low-probability events deviate from
Bayes’ rule? In the next section, our aim is to define an alternative equilibrium
in such signalling games when player 2 uses the updating rule according to the
Hypothesis Testing model.
3.3 Hypothesis Testing Equilibrium
3.3.1 Definition of HTE in general signalling games
In a signalling game, player 2 cannot observe player 1’s strategies but can observe
the messages sent by player 1; therefore, it is helpful to understand an SNE in the
following way: imagine that player 2 has a conjecture, σˆ(·; t),∀t ∈ T , about player
1’s behaviour before player 1 moves. She attempts to formulate a best response
using her conjecture. Similarly, player 1 also has a conjecture, τˆ , about player 2’s
behaviour. In equilibrium, the conjecture profile (σˆ, τˆ) coincides with the strategy
profile (σ∗, τ ∗) that players actually use. Each conjecture σˆ available to player 2
about player 1’s behaviour induces a prior (belief) pi on the state space Ω = T ×M
if the marginal distribution
∑
m∈M pi(t,m) coincides with the initial distribution µ.
For every realization (t,m), pi(t,m) is a joint probability of type t and message m,
37
3. HYPOTHESIS TESTING EQUILIBRIUM IN SIGNALING
GAMES
which is
pi(t,m) = σˆ(m; t)µ(t), and
∑
t∈T
∑
m∈M
pi(t,m) =
∑
t
µ(t) = 1.
If player 2 follows an updating rule according to the Hypothesis Testing model,
then player 2 has a set of “rational” conjectures (priors), and she has a probability
distribution ρ on the set of conjectures (priors). First, we address some requirements
for the second-order prior ρ.
Definition 3.2. Consider a finite signalling game Γ(µ) in which player 2’s pref-
erence admits a Hypothesis Testing model (ρ, ). ρ is consistent if it satisfies the
following requirements:
(i). ∀pi ∈ supp(ρ), pi is compatible with the initial information of the game, that
is,
∑
m∈M pi(t,m) = µ(t).
(ii). ∀pi ∈ supp(ρ), pi can be rationalized by at least one possible strategy of
player 2. That is, there exists some strategy τ : M → ∆(R) of player 2 such that
pi(t,m) = 0,∀t ∈ T,∀m ∈M , if the type-message pair (t,m) is not a best response
to τ .
As addressed in Ortoleva (2012), this requirement for rationality is a weak
condition in the sense that player 2 can take any conjecture into consideration as
long as it is compatible with player 1’s best response to some possible strategy τ
of player 2. Now, we are prepared to define HTE in signalling games.
Definition 3.3. In a finite signalling game Γ(µ), a profile of behavioural strategies
(σ∗, τ ∗) is an HTE based on a Hypothesis Testing model (ρ, ) if
(i). ρ is consistent.
(ii). The support of ρ contains piΩ induced by σ
∗, and
piΩ = argmax
pi∈supp(ρ)
ρ(pi).
Let
ME = {m ∈M :
∑
t∈T
piΩ(m|t)µ(t) > },
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then for any m ∈M\ME, there exists some pim ∈ supp(ρ), such that
pim = argmax
pi∈supp(ρ)
BU(ρ,m)(pi).
(iii).For all t ∈ T , σ∗(m; t) > 0 implies that m maximizes the expected utility
of player 1, and
τ ∗(·;m) ∈ MBR(m,µ(·|m)),
where
µ(t|m) =
piΩ(t|m) =
σ∗(m;t)µ(t)∑
t′ σ∗(m;t′)µ(t′)
if m ∈ME
pim(t|m) = pim(m|t)µ(t)∑
t′ pim(m|t′)µ(t′) , otherwise.
The idea behind this definition is similar to that of Nash equilibrium except
that we allow non-Bayesian reactions for out-of-equilibrium messages when  > 0.
Therefore, dynamic consistency is violated but only up to . However, dynamic
consistency holds when  = 0, and the updating rule is also well defined after
zero-probability messages. According to the definition, for a given , to prove that
a profile of strategies is an HTE based on (ρ, ), we simply need to find a proper ρ
to support the equilibrium.
Example 1. As an illustration, we apply this definition to the simple game
depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1
In this game, it is very easy to verify that there is one separating SNE: type t1 of
player 1 chooses message m1, and type t2 chooses message m2; player 2, regardless
of which message is observed, chooses r1. If player 2 has a threshold  = 5%, then
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this equilibrium is an HTE supported by a Hypothesis Testing model (ρ, ), where
supp(ρ) only contains one element pi induced by the strategy of player 1. That is,
pi satisfies the following conditions:
pi(t1,m1) + pi(t1,m2) = 0.05, pi(t2,m1) + pi(t2,m2) = 0.95;
pi(m1|t1) = 1, pi(m2|t2) = 1.
This prior (belief) pi can be rationalized by a strategy of player 2, which is choosing
r1 regardless of which message is observed.
In this example, there also exists an HTE that is not an SNE:
σ∗(m1; t1) = 1, σ∗(m2; t2) = 1;
τ ∗(r2;m1) = 1, τ ∗(r1;m2) = 1.
The support of ρ contains two elements pi and pˆi such that 0 < ρ(pˆi) < ρ(pi) < 0.9524,
and
pi(t1) = 0.05, pi(t2) = 0.95, pi(m1|t1) = 1, pi(m2|t2) = 1;
pˆi(t1) = 0.05, pˆi(t2) = 0.95, pˆi(m1|t1) = 1, pˆi(m1|t2) = 1.
pi can be rationalized by the strategy τ ∗, and pˆi can be rationalized by choosing
r2 regardless of the message observed. Now let us verify that (σ
∗, τ ∗) is an HTE
supported by (ρ, ). Given τ ∗,
u1(t1,m1, τ
∗) = 3 > u1(t1,m2, τ ∗) = 0;
u1(t2,m2, τ
∗) = 3 > u1(t2,m1, τ ∗) = 2;
therefore, σ∗ maximizes player 1’s expected payoff for both types. Given σ∗, player
2 starts with belief pi since ρ(pi) > ρ(pˆi) and retains pi if she observes m2 since
pi(m2) = pi(m2|t1)pi(t1) + pi(m2|t2)pi(t2) = 0.95 > .
With the posterior belief pi(·|m2), observing m2, player 2’s best response is r1. She
switches to belief pˆi if she observes m1 since
pi(m1) = pi(m1|t1)pi(t1) + pi(m1|t2)pi(t2) = 0.05 ≤ ,
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and
BU(ρ,m1)(pˆi) > BU(ρ,m1)(pi).
Therefore, observing m1, player 2 has the posterior assessment of pˆi(t1|m1) = 0.05
and pˆi(t2|m1) = 0.95. With this posterior belief, player 2 computes her expected
payoffs as follows:
u2(r1;m1, σ
∗) = pˆi(t1|m1)× 1 + pˆi(t2|m1)× 0 = 0.05;
u2(r2;m1, σ
∗) = pˆi(t1|m1)× 0 + pˆi(t2|m1)× 1 = 0.95,
which implies that r2 is the best response to m1. Therefore, (σ
∗, τ ∗) is an HTE but
not a Nash Equilibrium, as r2 is not a best response of player 2 to the message m1
if she only has one belief pi.
3.3.2 Properties of Hypothesis Testing Equilibrium
From the previous example, we can immediately obtain the following property:
Proposition 3.2. In a finite signalling game Γ(µ), if a profile of behavioural
strategies (σ, τ) is an HTE supported by a Hypothesis Testing model (ρ, 0), then it
is also an HTE supported by a Hypothesis Testing model (ρ, ), for all  > 0.
Proof. Let ME0 and M
E
 denote the sets of messages that are sent by player 1
with probability zero or a probability less than or equal to , respectively. Then,
ME ⊆ME0 . We can simply take
ρ = ρ = {piΩ, pim,m ∈M\ME}.
Player 2 starts with piΩ = argmaxpi∈supp(ρ) ρ(pi), she retains piΩ and proceeds with
Bayesian updating if she observes m ∈ME . If m ∈ME0 \ME , there exists pim = piΩ
such that σ and τ are sequentially rational. If m /∈ ME0 , there exists pi′m that is
identical to pim such that σ and τ are sequentially rational. 
As we can see from the previous example, if  > 0, then any message sent with
probability less than or equal to  is an out-of-equilibrium message. Because of
dynamic inconsistency, an HTE may deviate from an SNE. However, when  = 0,
only the messages sent with zero probability are off-the-equilibrium path; therefore,
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it is not surprising that there is a close relationship between this special class of
HTE and SNE.
Proposition 3.3. In a finite signalling game Γ(µ), an HTE supported by a Hy-
pothesis Testing model (ρ, 0) is a refinement of SNE.
This requires no proof, as it relies solely on the definitions of HTE and SNE. If
a profile of strategies (σ∗, τ ∗) is an HTE supported by (ρ, 0), then for any message
sent by player 1 such that σ∗(m; t) > 0 for some t ∈ T , player 2’s posterior belief
derived by Bayesian updating using σ∗. For any message sent with zero probability,
that is, σ∗(m; t) = 0 for all t ∈ T , there exists some belief on the side of player 2 to
rationalize her behaviour. In addition, (σ∗, τ ∗) is sequentially rational. Therefore,
(σ∗, τ ∗) is an SNE. Moreover, according to definition 3.2, we require that any belief
in the support of ρ must can be “rationalized” by at least one strategy of player 2,
which means, in addition to the requirement of equation (3.2), that we actually
impose a further restriction on the out-of-equilibrium beliefs of player 2. Therefore,
it is not surprising that an SNE may not be an HTE supported by some (ρ, 0),
as in the example of the “Quiche-Beer” game in Ortoleva (2012). Here, we also
provide a simple example3 to demonstrate this property.200 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
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In the game depicted in Figure. 2, (t1,m), (t2,m) is an SNE supported by a
belief of player 2 such that µ(t1|m) = 0.9 and µ(t2|m′) ≥ 0.5. However, this is not
an HTE supported by (ρ, 0) because there does not exist a ρ such that supp(ρ)
3This example is from Cho and Kreps (1987)
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contains a “rationalized” belief pim′ regarding the out-of-equilibrium message m
′.
By contradiction, assume that there exists pim′ such that pim′(t2|m′) ≥ 0.5 and
pim′ can be rationalized by some strategy of player 2. If pim′(t2|m′) ≥ 0.5, then
pim′(t2,m
′) > 0, which implies that for any strategy τ that is rationalized pim′ , m′
must be a best response of t2 to strategy τ . However, for type t2, m
′ is strictly
dominated by m, which implies that there is no such strategy τ such that m′ is a
best response to t2. This is contrary to condition (ii) in consistency definition 3.2.
3.4 Existence of HTE
3.4.1 Definition, notations, and assumptions
Proposition 3.1 indicates that, in a signalling game, an HTE supported by (ρ, )
exists if an HTE supported by (ρ, 0) exists. Moreover, an HTE supported by (ρ, 0)
is a refinement of SNE, which interests us because it allows us to compare our
definition of HTE with other refinement criteria. Therefore, in the analysis to
follow, we simply need to restrict our attention to this class of HTE by imposing
 = 0. Since mixed strategies are not needed to prove existence, we only consider
the Pure Sequential Nash Equilibrium (PSNE). A pure strategy of player 1 is
a mapping s1 : T → M , and a pure strategy of player 2 is a response function
s2;M → R.
Definition 3.4. In a finite signalling game Γ(µ), a profile of strategies (s∗1, s
∗
2)
forms a PSNE if there exists βm ∈ ∆(T ), ∀ m /∈ME, such that:
(i). Given s∗2,
u1(t, s
∗
1(t), s
∗
2(s
∗
1(t))) ≥ u1(t,m, s∗2(m)), ∀m ∈M, ∀t ∈ T.
(ii).Given s∗1, for any m ∈M , s∗2(m) ∈ BR(m,µ2(·|m)), where
µ2(t|m) =
β(t|m) if m ∈MEβm(t|m) otherwise,
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and
β(t|m) =

µ(t)∑
t′∈Tm,s∗1
µ(t′) if t ∈ Tm,s∗1
0, otherwise,
where Tm,s∗1 = {t ∈ T : s∗1(t) = m}.
Before we prove the existence theorem, we provide some notations that we may
use in the statements.
Tm,s1 : the subset of types of player 1 who send message m under strategy s1, that
is,
Tm,s1 = {t ∈ T : s1(t) = m}.
ME(s1,s2): the set of on-the-equilibrium messages if (s1, s2) ∈ PSNE(Γ(µ)), that is,
ME(s1,s2) = {m ∈M : ∃t ∈ T, s. t. s1(t) = m}.
u1(t; s1, s2): the payoff of type t under strategy (s1, s2), that is,
u1(t; s1, s2) = u1(t, s1(t), s2(s1(t))).
βTm ∈ ∆(T ): the probability assessment concentrating on types t ∈ Tm, that is,
βTm(t) =

µ(t)∑
t′∈Tm µ(t
′) if t ∈ Tm
0 otherwise.
βt ∈ ∆(T ): the probability assessment concentrating on type t, that is,
βt(t
′) =
1 if t′ = t0 otherwise.
We cannot be confident that there exists an HTE for a game that is randomly
selected from the space of signalling games with finite states; instead, we prove
the existence theorem in a class of signalling games that satisfy the following
assumptions.
Assumption 3.1. T , M , and R are finite. The type of player 1 has a probability
distribution, µ ∈ ∆(T ), with full support. Further, ui(t, s1, s2) , i ∈ {1, 2}, exists
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and is finite for all t ∈ T and all nondecreasing functions s1 : T → M and
s2 : M → R.
Assumption 3.2. For any t ∈ T , for any fixed r ∈ R, if we connect the points
{u1(t,m, r) : m ∈M} in order by a smooth line, then u1(t) is strictly concave in
m, and u2 is strictly concave in r.
Assumption 3.3. First-order stochastic dominance: ∀t ∈ T , ∀m ∈ M , ∀β, β′ ∈
∆(T ), whenever β stochastically dominants β′, that is,∑
t′≤t
β′(t′) ≥
∑
t′≤t
β(t′), ∀t ∈ T,
and strict inequality holds for some t ∈ T , then
u1(t,m,BR(m,β)) > u1(t,m,BR(m,β
′)).
Assumption 3.4. Single Crossing Property:
(i). For all m > m′, and all t′ > t,∀r, r′ ∈ R,
u1(t,m, r) ≥ (>)u1(t,m′, r′), implies
u1(t
′,m, r) ≥ (>)u1(t′,m′, r′).
(ii). For all rˆ > r, and all mˆ > m, ∀ t ∈ T ,
u2(t,m, rˆ) ≥ (>)u2(t,m, r), implies
u2(t, mˆ, rˆ) ≥ (>)u2(t, mˆ, r).
Assumption 3.1 is primarily a technical assumption to fit our definition of
HTE. Assumption 3.2 insures that only pure strategies are considered by both
players. Assumption 3.3 states that all types of player 1 prefer the best response of
player 2 when player 2 believes that player 1 is more likely to be of a higher type.
The fourth assumption is the Milgrom-Shannon Single Crossing Property (SCP)
(Milgrom and Shannon, 1994) for both players, which is a widely used assumption
in signalling games to model many economic problems. It states that if type t
prefers a higher message-response pair (m, r) to a lower message-response pair
(m′, r′), then any higher type t′ > t also prefers the higher message-response pair
(m, r). This captures the idea that higher messages are more easily sent by a higher
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type. The utility of player 2 also satisfies the SCP: If a higher response rˆ is a better
response to a message m sent by type t than r, then it is also a better response to
a higher message mˆ sent by t than r. Athey (2001) characterizes the single crossing
condition in several classes of incomplete information games, such as all types of
games with supermodular and log-supermodular payoffs, limit pricing games, and
auctions.
Before we proceed to the existence theorem, let us review the concept of
lexicographical dominance introduced by Mailath et al., (1993).
Definition 3.5. In a signalling game Γ(µ), a strategy profile (s∗1, s
∗
2) ∈ PSNE(Γ(µ))
lexicographically dominates (l-dominates) another strategy profile (s1, s2) ∈ PSNE(Γ(µ))
if there exists j ∈ T , such that
u1(t; s
∗
1, s
∗
2) > u1(t; s1, s2) if t = j
u1(t; s
∗
1, s
∗
2) ≥ u1(t; s1, s2) if t ≥ j + 1.
A strategy profile (s∗1, s
∗
2) ∈ PSNE(Γ(µ)) is a lexicographically maximum sequential
equilibrium (LMSE) if there is no (s1, s2) ∈ PSNE(Γ(µ)) l-dominates (s∗1, s∗2).
If we restrict player 1’s types to a subset of T , we can define a truncated game
from G. Formally, for any j ∈ T , let
T j = {1, ..., j}, µj(t) = βT j .
A truncated game Gj is defined by substituting T j for T and the T j−conditional
prior µj for the prior µ in original game. Then, we can obtain the following
properties:
Proposition 3.4. Assume that (s1, s2) ∈ PSNE(Γ(µ)), ∀ j ∈ T , if s1(t) 6= s1(j),
∀t > j, then (sj1, sj2) ∈ PSNE(Γj(µj)), where sj1(t) = s1(t), ∀ t ≤ j, and sj2(m) =
s2(m) ∀ m ∈M .
The following lemma derived in Mailath et al. (1993) is very important for our
proof. The reader is urged to read their paper to obtain a detailed analysis of this
result.
Proposition 3.5. Mailath et al. (1993): Under A3.1-A3.4, suppose that (s1, s2) ∈
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PSNE(Γ(µ)), (sˆ1, sˆ2) ∈ PSNE(Γj(µj)), and for some j ∈ T ,
u1(j; sˆ1, sˆ2) > u1(j; s1, s2),
then there exists (s∗1, s
∗
2) ∈ PSNE(Γ(µ)), such that
u1(t; s
∗
1, s
∗
2) ≥ u1(t; sˆ1, sˆ2) for all t ≤ j and
u1(t; s
∗
1, s
∗
2) ≥ u1(t; s1, s2) for all t > j.
That is, (s∗1, s
∗
2) l-dominates (s1, s2).
3.4.2 Existence of HTE supported by a Hypothesis Testing
model (ρ, 0)
Theorem 3.1. Under A3.1− A3.4, an LMSE is an HTE.
To prove the theorem, we need the following critical results:
Lemma 3.1. (Athey, 2001): Under A3.1 and A3.4, there exists a PSNE in Γ(µ).
Therefore, an LMSE exists. Moreover, both players play nondecreasing strate-
gies:
Lemma 3.2. Under A3.1 and A3.4, ∀ (s∗1, s∗2) ∈ PSNE(Γ(µ)), s∗1(t) ≤ s∗1(t′) if
t < t′.
Proof. In equilibrium (s∗1, s
∗
2) , ∀t, t′ ∈ T ,
u1(t; s
∗
1, s
∗
2) ≥ u1(t, s∗1(t′), s∗2(s∗1(t′))).
Suppose that s∗1(t) > s
∗
1(t
′) , and t′ > t, by assumption of the SCP,
u1(t
′; s∗1, s
∗
2) > u1(t
′; s∗1(t
′), s∗2(s
∗
1(t
′))) = u∗1(t
′; s∗1, s
∗
2),
which upsets the equilibrium. 
Lemma 3.3. Under A3.1 and A3.4, ∀ (s∗1, s∗2) ∈ PSNE(Γ(µ)), s∗2(m) ≤ s∗2(m′) if
m < m′.
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Proof. In equilibrium (s∗1, s
∗
2) , ∀m′ > m ∈ M , since s∗2(m) is a best response to
message m for any t,
u2(t
′,m, s∗2(m)) ≥ u2(t′,m, s∗2(m′)).
Suppose that s∗2(m) > s
∗
2(m
′), from assumption A3.4
u2(t
′,m′, s∗2(m)) ≥ u2(t′,m′, s∗2(m′)),
which is contrary to the fact that s∗2(m
′) is a best response to m′. 
Lemma 3.4. For an (s∗1, s
∗
2) ∈ PSNE(Γ(µ)), let
T (r) = {t ∈ T : u1(t,m, r) > u1(t; s∗1, s∗2)}, (3.3)
then under A3.1 and A3.4, T (r) is convex.
Proof. For all t′, t′′ ∈ T (r), t′ < t′′, suppose that there ∃ t ∈ [t′, t′′], such that
u1(t,m, r) ≤ u1(t; s∗1, s∗2).
If m > s∗2(t), as t
′ < t, by A4, we obtain
u1(t
′,m, r) ≤ u1(t′, s∗1(t), s∗2(s∗1(t))).
In equilibrium,
u1(t
′, s∗1(t), s
∗
2(s
∗
1(t))) ≤ u1(t′; s∗1, s∗2);
therefore,
u1(t
′,m, r) ≤ u1(t′; s∗1, s∗2),
which is contrary to the assumption that t′ ∈ T (r). We can analogously prove the
other case in which m < s∗2(t) to obtain a contradiction with t
′′ ∈ T (r). Therefore,
∀ t ∈ [t′, t′′], t ∈ T (r), which implies that T (r) is convex. 
Given a response r of player 2 to message m, T (r) is the set of types who are
willing to deviate from the equilibrium strategy.
Lemma 3.5. If r < r′, then T (r) ⊆ T (r′).
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Proof. ∀ t ∈ T (r),
u1(t,m, r) < u1(t,m, r
′)
u1(t,m, r) > u1(t; s
∗
1, s
∗
2).
The first inequality holds because of A3.3. Therefore,
u1(t; s
∗
1, s
∗
2) < u1(t,m, r
′),
which implies that t ∈ T (r′). 
This lemma implies that a higher response to message m induces more types of
player 1 to deviate from the equilibrium strategy to m.
For each message m ∈ M , we can form a set of responses of player 2 under
which at least one type of player 1 is willing to deviate from the equilibrium
strategy to m. Let
Rm = {r ∈ R : ∃t ∈ T, s. t. u1(t,m, r) > u1(t; s1, s2)}. (3.4)
Case (i). Rm = ∅. In this case, no type would deviate to m from his equilibrium
strategy given any response by player 2, that is, β(t|m) = 0, ∀ t ∈ T .
Case (ii). If Rm 6= ∅, then let rm = minRm. Then, T (rm) is the set of types who
are willing to deviate to m driven by the smallest trigger response by player 2.
The main idea of the proof of the existence theorem as follows: For each
out-of-equilibrium message m, there is a posterior belief supporting the LMSE
that can be rationalized by one strategy of player 2. We find such a strategy of
player 2: She plays a response rm to m and retains her equilibrium responses to
any other message. Now, let us prove Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let (s1, s2) be an LMSE in Γ(µ). To prove that (s1, s2)
is an HTE, we simply need to prove that for any out-of-equilibrium message m,
there exists a belief β(·|m) ∈ ∆(T ), such that s2(m) = BR(m,β(·|m)), can be ra-
tionalized by some strategy s˜2,m : M → R. Then, we can construct the Hypothesis
Testing model (ρ, 0) in which the support of ρ contains priors derived from beliefs
of on-the-equilibrium messages and out-of-equilibrium messages. Suppose that
m is an out-of-equilibrium message. Consider an out-of-equilibrium message m;
if Rm = ∅, then any β(·|m) ∈ ∆(T ), such that s2(m) = BR(m,β(·|m)), can be
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rationalized by s2. If Rm 6= ∅, we aim to find a strategy for player 2 to rationalize
β(·|m). According to Lemma 3.4, we can denote T (rm) = [i, j] (in our finite setting,
in fact, T (rm) is the set of types located between i and j.), where
i = min{t ∈ T : u1(t,m, rm) > u1(t; s1, s2)}
j = max{t ∈ T : u1(t,m, rm) > u1(t; s1, s2)}.
We denote mj = s1(j) and k = max{t ∈ T : s1(t) = s1(j)}. If m > mj , then k = j
by assumption A4. If m < mj, then u(t,mj, rm) > u(t,m, rm), for all t ∈ [j, k],
because of the concavity assumption A2. Now let us consider the k-truncated game
Γk(µk). We claim that there is no profile of strategies (sˆk1, sˆ
k
2) ∈ PSNE(Γk(µk))
such that sˆk1(t) = m and sˆ
k
2(m) = rm for any t ∈ [i, j]. Suppose, contrary to
the assertion, that there exists such an equilibrium (sˆk1, sˆ
k
2), and in equilibrium,
∃j0 ∈ [i, j],
sˆk1(j0) = m, and
sˆk2(m) = rm.
We denote
h = max{t ∈ [i, k], sˆk1(t) = sˆk1(j0)};
then, h < j because either j = k or sˆk1(t) > m, ∀t ∈ [j, k]. Proposition. 3.4 implies
that (sˆk1, sˆ
k
2) is a PSNE in the h-truncated game Γ
h(µh) by simply dropping the
strategies of types higher than h, and
u1(h; sˆ
k
1, sˆ
k
2) > u1(h; s1, s2).
Therefore, Prop. 3.5 implies that there exists (s∗1, s
∗
2) that l -dominates (s1, s2),
which is contrary to the assumption that (s1, s2) is an LMSE. This analysis
means that for any (sˆk1, sˆ
k
2) ∈ PSNE(Γk(µk)), BR(m,β[i,j]) < rm. In particular,
(s1, s2) is a PSNE of Γ
k(µk) by simply deleting the strategies of the types higher
than k; therefore, s2(m) < rm. To summarize the argument above, for any
out-of-equilibrium message m, there exists a belief β(·|m) ∈ ∆(T ), such that
50
3.4 Existence of HTE
s2(m) = BR(m,β(·|m)), can be rationalized by the strategy s˜2 of player 2:
s˜2(m) = rm,
s˜2(m
′) = s2(m′), ∀m′ 6= m.
For all t ∈ T (rm),
u1(t,m, s˜2(m)) = u1(t,m, rm)
> u1(t; s1, s2)
≥ u1(t,m′, s2(m′)) ∀m′ ∈M
= u1(t,m
′, s˜2(m′)) ∀m′ ∈M,
and for all t /∈ T (rm), ∃ s1(t) 6= m, such that u1(t,m, s˜2(m)) ≤ u1(t; s1, s2).
Therefore, given s˜,
β(m|t) = 1, ∀t ∈ T (rm),
β(m|t) = 0, ∀t /∈ T (rm).
We can construct a Hypothesis Testing model (ρ, 0) in which
supp(ρ) = {piΩ, {pim : ∀m /∈ME(s1,s2)}},
where
piΩ(·|m) = βTm,s1 , ∀m ∈ME(s1,s2)
pim(t|m) = β(t|m) = βT (rm), ∀t ∈ T, ∀m /∈ME(s1,s2),
with
ρ(pim) = 0, if Rm = ∅,
otherwise, 0 < ρ(pim) = ρ(pi
′
m) < ρ(piΩ) if m,m
′ /∈ME(s1,s2), Rm, R′m 6= ∅,
and
∑
m∈M\ME
(s1,s2)
ρ(pim) + ρ(piΩ) = 1.
By construction, (s1, s2) is an HTE supported by (ρ, 0). Q.E.D
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3.4.3 Uniqueness of constrained HTE
As noted above, under condition (ii) on the requirements for the consistency of ρ,
player 2 is allowed to consider any strategy of player 1 as long as the strategy is
compatible with a best response to a strategy of player 2, which enlarges the set of
alternative beliefs of player 2. However, it is natural for us to restrict the strategies
of player 1 such that player 2’s alternative beliefs are around her original belief.
Definition 3.6. An HTE (s1, s2) ∈ PSNE(Γ(µ)) is a constrained HTE if, for
any out-of-equilibrium message m, there exists a posterior belief conditional on m
supporting the equilibrium that can be rationalized by
s˜2(m) = rm
s˜2(m
′) = s2(m′) ∀m′ 6= m.
(3.5)
Remark. In a constrained HTE, any belief of an out-of-equilibrium message
supporting the equilibrium can be rationalized by a strategy of player 2 that is
not far from her equilibrium strategy. This idea is quite intuitive; when player 2
observes a message that deviates from her original belief, she searches for the most
likely types who have a potential incentive to send this message and forms her new
belief by simply perturbing her original belief regarding this message.
Remark. In an HTE, it is required that there exists pim ∈ supp(ρ), such that
pim is compatible with s˜2. If pim can be deduced by player 1’s strategy s˜1, then s˜2
may not be a best response to s˜1; only s˜1 is required to be a best response to s˜2.
If (s˜1, s˜2) forms an equilibrium, then in this equilibrium, u1(t,m, s˜2) ≤ u1(t; s1, s2),
∀ t ∈ T . This case coincides with the Undefeated Equilibrium proposed by Mailath
et al. (1993).
Look through the proof of the existence theorem, we can immediately obtain
the following proposition.
Proposition 3.6. Under A3.1- A3.4, an LMSE is a constrained HTE.
Now, we seek to prove the uniqueness of a constrained HTE if an LMSE is
unique.
Proposition 3.7. Under A3.1-A3.4, an LMSE is unique.
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Proof. Suppose that both (s∗1, s
∗
2) and (s1, s2) are LMSE, as (s
∗
1, s
∗
2) is not l -
dominating (s1, s2), for any t0 ∈ T , such that:
u1(t0; s
∗
1, s
∗
2) > u1(t0; s1, s2),
∃t1 > t0, such that
u1(t1; s
∗
1, s
∗
2) < u1(t1; s1, s2).
We have the same expression for (s1, s2), and T is finite; therefore, (s
∗
1, s
∗
2) and
(s1, s2) are identical. 
Clearly, all other strategy profiles (s1, s2) ∈ PSNE(Γ(µ)) must be l -dominated
by the unique LMSE. Let us denote the unique LMSE as (sLM1 , s
LM
2 ).
Theorem 3.2. Under A3.1-A3.4, if the unique LMSE is completely separating,
and M is rich enough, then the outcome of a constrained HTE supported by (ρ, 0)
is unique.
Lemma 3.6. Under A3.1-A3.4, if (s1, s2) ∈ PSNE(Γ(µ)) is a completely separating
equilibrium, let j = min{t ∈ T : u1(t; sLM1 , sLM2 ) > u1(t; s1, s2)}, and ∀ t ∈ T ,
s1(t) 6= sLM1 (j), then (s1, s2) is not a constrained HTE.
Proof. If j = min{t ∈ T : u1(t; sLM1 , sLM2 ) > u1(t; s1, s2)}, we denote
sLM1 (j) = m, s
LM
2 (m) = r
∗
j ,
s1(j) = mj, s2(mj) = rj.
We assume that β(·|m) ∈ ∆(T ) is a posterior belief supporting the equilibrium
(s1, s2); then, R(m) 6= ∅ since u1(j,m, r∗j ) > u1(j; s1, s2). Let rm = minRm; then,
r∗j ≥ rm. Further, we can show that rm = r∗j . This is true because of the following
argument. By assumption, we have the following conditions:
u1(j,m, r
∗
j ) > u1(j,mj, rj) and
u1(j,mj, rj) > u1(j,m, s2(m)),
⇒u1(j,m, r∗j ) > u1(j,m, s2(m))
⇒s2(m) < r∗j
⇒BR(m,β(·|m)) < BR(m,βj),
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the last condition holds because (sLM1 , s
LM
2 ) is a completely separating equilibrium.
Therefore, by the SCP of the utility function of player 2, we have∑
t∈T
β(t|m) < µ(j), and ∃t0 < j, β(t0|m) > 0.
Let
T (rm) = {t ∈ T : u1(t,m, rm) > u1(t, s1, s2)}.
By contradiction, suppose that (s1, s2) is a constrained HTE ; then β(·|m) can be
rationalized by s˜2 given in Equ. (3.5). Moreover β(t0|m) > 0 implies that m is a
best response of t0 to s˜2, that is, u1(t0,m, s˜2(m)) > u1(t0,m
′, s˜2(m′)), ∀ m′ ∈ M .
Therefore, t0 ∈ T (rm). However,
u1(t; s
LM
1 , s
LM
2 ) ≤ u1(t; s1, s2) ∀t < j,
and together with the following condition
u1(t; s
LM
1 , s
LM
2 ) ≥ u1(t;m, r∗j ),
implies that
u1(t,m, r
∗
j ) < u1(t; s1, s2) ∀t < j.
Therefore, ∀ r < r∗j ,
u1(t0,m, r) ≤ u1(t0;m, r∗j ) < u1(t0; s1, s2).
Therefore, rm ≥ r∗j , which induces rm = r∗j . However, with this strategy s˜2,
u1(j,m, s˜2) = u1(j,m, r
∗
j ) > u1(j; s1, s2) ≥ u1(j,m′, s˜2(m′)), ∀m′ ∈M,
which implies that j ∈ T (rm). Therefore, β(j|m) = µ(j)∑
t∈T (rm) µ(t)
≥ µ(j). We have
a contradiction with
∑
t∈T β(t|m) < µ(j). 
Now let us prove Theorem 3.2.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. We simply need to show that any (s1, s2) ∈ PSNE(Γ(µ))
that is l -dominated by (sLM1 , s
LM
2 ) is not a constrained HTE. For any (s1, s2) ∈
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PSNE(Γ(µ)), let
j = min{t ∈ T : u1(t; sLM1 , sLM2 ) > u1(t; s1, s2)},
and sLM1 (j) = mj . If mj is an out-of-equilibrium message under (s1, s2), by Lemma
3.6, we can immediately obtain the conclusion. However, if mj ∈ME(s1,s2), according
to our assumption, if M is rich enough, we can select an m slightly greater than mj
but less than sLM1 (j + 1) such that m /∈ME(s1,s2) and form a new PSNE (s∗1, s∗2) by
simply perturbing (sLM1 , s
LM
2 ) at j. Then, (s
∗
1, s
∗
2) still l -dominates (s1, s2). This can
be done because (sLM1 , s
LM
2 ) is a completely separating equilibrium. Again, Lemma
3.6 implies that (s1, s2) is not a constrained HTE. Q.E.D
Corollary 3.1. Under A3.1- A3.4, if there only exist completely separating equi-
libria, then a “Pareto-dominant equilibrium” or “Riley equilibrium” is the unique
constrained HTE.
Proof. A “Riley equilibrium” maximizes the payoffs of all types in the set of
completely separating equilibria, which means that it is the unique LMSE ; therefore,
it is the unique constrained HTE. 
This proposition ensures that our HTE concept can capture the well-known
“Pareto-dominant separating equilibrium” or “Riley outcome” that is often selected
in economic applications.
3.5 Comparison with Intuitive Criterion
Intuitive Criterion: (Cho and Kreps, 1987) Fix a sequential equilibrium outcome
and let u∗1(t) be the payoff of a type t of player 1 in this equilibrium. For each
out-of-equilibrium message m, form the set
S(m) = {t ∈ T : u∗1(t) > max
r∈BR(T (m),m)
u1(t,m, r)}. (3.6)
If, for some out-of-equilibrium message m there exists a type t′ ∈ T such that
u∗1(t
′) < min
r∈BR(T\S(m),m)
u1(t
′,m, r), (3.7)
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then the equilibrium outcome fails the Intuitive Criterion. Here T (m) denotes the
set of types of player 1 who have options to send the message m.
Proposition 3.8. In a finite signalling game Γ(µ), if (σ1, σ2) ∈ SNE(Γ(µ)) fails
the Intuitive Criterion, then it is also not a Constrained HTE supported by a
Hypothesis Testing model (ρ, 0).
Proof. If (σ1, σ2) ∈ SNE(Γ(µ)) fails the Intuitive Criterion, then for some m /∈
ME(σ1,σ2), ∃ t′ ∈ T , such that condition (3.7) holds. We prove that for this m, any
belief pim ∈ ∆(T ×M), such that
u1(t; s1, s2) ≥ u1(t,m,BR(m,pim(·|m))), ∀t ∈ T, (3.8)
cannot be rationalized by the strategy of player 2 given in (3.5). By contradiction,
suppose that there exists s˜2 : M → R that rationalizes pim(·|m). T and M are
finite; for this m ∈M , there exists a posterior distribution µ2(·|m) ∈ ∆(T ) such
that s˜2(m) = BR(T (m),m, µ2(·|m)). By the definition of S(m),
u∗1(t) > max
r∈BR(T (m),m)
u1(t,m, r) > u1(t,m, s˜2(m)),
which implies that the types in S(m) would never deviate from their equilibrium
strategy to m. Therefore,
pim(t,m) = 0, ∀t ∈ S(m),
which implies that BR(pim, T\S,m) = BR(pim, T,m). Since there exists t′ ∈ T ,
u∗1(t
′) < min
r∈BR(T (m)\S(m),m)
u1(t
′,m, r)
≤ u1(t′,m, r), r ∈ BR(pim, T (m)\S(m),m)
≤ u1(t′,m, r), r ∈ BR(pim, T (m),m).
Therefore, type t′ could achieve a payoff strictly higher than his expected equilibrium
payoff by sending the message m. This is contrary to condition (3.8).

Remark. We do not need to impose assumptions to obtain this property. In
addition, we do not need to restrict to pure strategies in this property. This result
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is illustrated in the following simple example.
Example 2. The simple game depicted in Figure 3 provides an example to
illustrate the result in Prop. 3.8. There are two PSNE in this game. In the first,
Figure 3
the strategies of player 1 and player 2 are given by
σ∗(m1; t1) = 1, σ∗(m1; t2) = 1;
τ ∗(r1;m1) = 1,
(3.9)
This is a PSNE supported by any belief of player 2 regarding out-of-equilibrium
message m2. We can easily verify that this equilibrium can satisfy the Intuitive
Criterion and is also an HTE. The second equilibrium is as follows:
σ∗(m2; t1) = 1, σ∗(m2; t2) = 1;
τ ∗(r1;m2) = 1.
(3.10)
This is supported by a belief such that µ2(t1|m1) < 0.5. First, we verify that this
PSNE can survive the Intuitive Criterion. For the out-of-equilibrium message m1,
we form the set
S(m1) = {t ∈ T : u∗1(t) > max
r∈BR(T,m1)
u1(t,m1, r)}.
Since
u∗1(t1) = 2 < max
r∈BR(T,m1)
u1(t1,m1, r) = u1(t1,m1, r1) = 3,
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and
u∗1(t2) = 0 < max
r∈BR(T,m1)
u1(t2,m1, r) = u1(t1,m1, r1) = 1,
we have S(m1) = ∅. Therefore, there is no type t′ such that
u∗1(t
′) < min
r∈BR(T\S(m1),m1)
u1(t
′,m1, r).
Second, we can show that this PSNE is not an HTE. By contradiction, if it is an
HTE, then for the out-of-equilibrium message m1, there must exist a belief pi
′ such
that pi′(t1|m1) < 0.5 can be rationalized by a strategy of player 2. pi′(t1|m1) < 0.5
implies that pi′(t2,m1) > 0. Then, according to the condition (ii) of consistency
definition 3.2 , any strategy of player 2 that rationalizes pi′ must be such that
m1 is a best response for type t2. If we write such a strategy of player 2 as
φ(r1;m1) = x ∈ [0, 1] and φ(r1;m2) = y ∈ [0, 1], then x and y must satisfy the
following condition:
u1(t2,m1, φ) ≥ u1(t2,m2, φ)
⇒ 1 · x+ (−1) · (1− x) ≥ 0 · y + (−2) · (1− y)
⇒ 2x− 2y + 1 ≥ 0.
Given such a strategy, the payoffs of type t1 are
u1(t1,m1, φ) = 3 · x+ 1.5 · (1− x) = 2.5x+ 1.5,
u1(t1,m2, φ) = 2 · y + 0 · (1− y) = 2y.
Since 2x− 2y + 1 ≥ 0x ∈ [0, 1], y ∈ [0, 1] ⇒ 2.5x+ 1.5 > 2y,
which means that m1 is the unique best response for type t1. That is, pi
′(m1|t1) = 1.
Therefore,
pi′(t1|m1) ≥ pi′(m1|t1)pi′(t1) = 0.6,
which is contrary to pi′(t1|m1) < 0.5.
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3.6 HTE of the Milgrom-Roberts model
In this section, we present an example of simplified version of the Milgrom and
Roberts (1982) limit pricing entry model to illustrate how to find an HTE. In this
example, there are two periods and two firms. Firm 1, the incumbent, has private
information concerning his unit cost. Firm 1 chooses a first-period quantity Q1. In
the second period, firm 2, the entrant, observes the quantity and decides whether
to enter the market. It pays a fixed cost K > 0 if it enters. Then, the private
information is revealed and last stage of the game is played, either by both firms
competing in a Cournot duopoly or by only the incumbent acting as a monopolist4.
Suppose that there are two possible costs for firm 1, (cL, cH). The common prior
is µ(c1 = cL) = 1− µ(c1 = cH) = x. Firm 2’s cost c2 > 0 is common knowledge.
We assume that the inverse market demand is given by P (Q) = a− bQ, a, b > 0.
Let Πt1(Q1) denote a firm 1 of type t’s monopoly profit in the first period if its
production quantity is Q1, that is
Πt1(Q1) = (a− bQ1 − ct)Q1 t ∈ {L,H},
then it is easily to see that Πt1(Q1) is strictly concave in Q1. Let Q
L
M and Q
H
M
denote firm 1’s monopoly quantities that maximize its short-run profit when its
cost is low or high, respectively. With our linear demand function, we obtain
QLM =
a− cL
2b
and QHM =
a− cH
2b
.
Let ΠLM and Π
H
M denote the monopoly profits under low and high cost, respectively,
that is
ΠLM = Π
L
1 (Q
L
M) =
(a− cL)2
4b
and ΠHM = Π
H
1 (Q
H
M) =
(a− cH)2
4b
.
Since we assume (as do Milgrom and Roberts, 1982) that firm 2 learns firm 1’s
cost immediately if firm 2 decides to enter the market; we can explicitly compute
the two firms’ Cournot duopoly profits with complete information.
Πt1C =
(a− 2ct + c2)2
9b
, and Πt2C =
(a− 2c2 + ct)2
9b
−K,
4J. Tirole (1988) analysed a similar model in which the two firms compete via a Bertrand
competition game if entry occurs
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where t ∈ {L,H}. We assume the discount factors δ1 = δ2 = δ. To make things
interesting, we assume that ΠH2C > 0 > Π
L
2C , which implies that, under complete
information, firm 2 enters the market if and only if firm 1 is of the high-cost type.
Furthermore, Ex(Π2C) < 0, which implies that firm 2 will not enter the market if
it only has the prior information.
To fit our HTE concept, we assume that firm 1 only has four choices of Q1,
that is, Q1 ∈ {QLM , QHM , QL1 , QH1 }, where Qt1 > QtM , ∀ t ∈ {L,H} that satisfy the
following conditions:
ΠL1 (Q
t
1) + δΠ
t
M > Π
t
M + δΠ
t
1C , ∀t ∈ {L,H}.
This condition implies that the low-cost (high-cost) type of firm 1 prefers to deter
the entrant by choosing a higher quantity QL1 (Q
H
1 ) if the monopoly quantity Q
L
M
(QHM) induces entry. Let Q˜
t
1 for t ∈ {L,H} denote the quantity at which level a
type t of firm 1 is indifferent between deterring and not deterring entry. That is,
Πt1(Q˜
t
1) + δΠ
t
M = Π
t
M + δΠ
t
1C , for t ∈ {L,H}.
Due to the strict concavity of Πt1(Q
t
1), we have Q˜
t
1 < Q
t
1. Now, there are only three
interesting cases left to us to analyse the equilibria:
(i). Q˜L1 > Q
L
1 > Q
L
M > Q˜
H
1 > Q
H
1 > Q
H
M ,
(ii). Q˜L1 > Q
L
1 > Q˜
H
1 > Q
H
1 > Q
L
M > Q
H
M ,
(iii). Q˜L1 > Q
L
1 > Q˜
H
1 > Q
L
M > Q
H
1 > Q
H
M .
In this example, we only consider the pure strategies of the firms; let
s : {L,H} → {QLM , QHM , QL1 , QH1 }
and
t : {QLM , QHM , QL1 , QH1 } → {0, 1}
be the strategies of firm 1 and firm 2, respectively. We can verify that, in this
game, assumptions A3.1-A3.4 are satisfied, and therefore, an HTE exists.
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Proposition 3.9. In case (i), there exist two separating PSNE:
s(L) = QLM , and s(H) = Q
H
M
t(Q1) =
 0 if Q1 ≥ QLM (PSNE 3.9.1)1 otherwise
and
s(L) = QL1 , and s(H) = Q
H
M
t(Q1) =
 0 if Q1 ≥ QL1 (PSNE 3.9.2)1 otherwise
Proposition 3.10. In case (i), both of the equilibria can survive the Intuitive
Criteria, but only the efficient separating equilibrium (PSNE 3.9.1) is an HTE.
The proof is in appendix A.
Proposition 3.11. In case (ii), there exist two pooling PSNE and one separating
PSNE:
s(L) = s(H) = QLM
t(Q1) =
 0 if Q1 ≥ QLM (PSNE 3.11.1)1 otherwise,
s(L) = s(H) = QH1
t(Q1) =
 0 if Q1 ≥ QH1 (PSNE 3.11.2)1 otherwise,
and
s(L) = QL1 , and s(H) = Q
H
M
t(Q1) =
 0 if Q1 ≥ QL1 (PSNE 3.11.3)1 otherwise
Proposition 3.12. In case (ii), all three PSNE can survive the Intuitive Criterion,
61
3. HYPOTHESIS TESTING EQUILIBRIUM IN SIGNALING
GAMES
but only the efficient equilibrium (PSNE 3.11.1) is an HTE.
The proof is given in Appendix B.
Proposition 3.13. In case (iii), there exist one separating PSNE and one pooling
PSNE:
s(L) = s(H) = QLM
t(Q1) =
 0 if Q1 ≥ QLM (PSNE 3.13.1)1 otherwise
and
s(L) = QL1 , and s(H) = Q
H
M
t(Q1) =
 0 if Q1 ≥ QL1 (PSNE 3.13.2)1 otherwise
Proposition 3.14. In case (iii), both of the PSNE can survive the Intuitive
Criterion, but only the efficient pooling equilibrium (PSNE 3.13.1) is an HTE.
We can prove this proposition using almost the same argument as in the proof
of Prop. 3.12. Thus, we omit the proof here.
To summarize this analysis of the limit pricing entry deterrence model, in each
case, there exists a unique HTE. In the HTE, the high-cost type of firm 1 either
chooses its monopoly quantity and allows entry or engages in pooling with the
low-cost type and deters entry depending on the cost of pooling. The low-cost type
choose its monopoly quantity and entry does not occur. By contrast, in each case,
there exist multi-equilibria that can survive the Intuitive Criterion. In separating
equilibria such as (PSNE 3.9.2), (PSNE 3.11.3), and (PSNE 3.12.2), although it
is costly for the high-cost type to pool with the low-cost type, the low-cost type of
firm 1 still needs to sacrifice its short-run profit and engages in limit pricing to
distinguish himself from the high-cost type. We argue that this type of equilibrium
cannot be an HTE because there is no a rational belief system to support the
equilibrium when an out-of-equilibrium message QLM is observed.
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3.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we propose a general definition of Hypothesis Testing Equilibrium
(HTE) in a framework of general signalling games with non-Bayesian players. We
focus on the analysis of a special class of HTE with the threshold  = 0 as a means
of equilibrium refinement that can survive the Intuitive Criterion. For a broad class
of signalling games, a Lexicographically Maximum Nash sequential equilibrium
(LMSE ) is an HTE, and if the LMSE is completely separating, then the constrained
HTE is unique. In the example of an entry deterrence game, we show that there
exists a unique HTE in each interesting case. However, there are aspects of HTE
that we have not considered, in particular, the existence and uniqueness in more
general signalling games. Natural extensions are to apply the concept of HTE in
signalling games in which the state space is infinite or to consider general dynamic
games. When  > 0, the dynamic consistency condition is violated, and there
will be some difficulties in making these extensions. Nevertheless, when  = 0,
dynamic consistency holds, and in that case further research to apply the idea of
HTE to dynamic games, even more general games, for equilibrium refinement is
encouraged.
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Chapter 4
Entry Deterrence Games under
Ambiguity
Abstract
In this chapter, we introduce ambiguity into an entry deterrence game in which
the potential entrant has multiple priors on the true state of aggregate demand.
We formulate two models with respect to the information asymmetries between
the established firm and the potential entrant. In the first model, the established
firm is fully informed of the true state, and in the second, the established firm is
also uncertain about the state but is informed of the distribution of the state. In
both models, we characterize the conditions under which limit pricing emerges in
equilibria, and thus ambiguity decreases the probability of entry. Welfare analysis
shows that limit pricing is more harmful in a market with higher expected demand
than in a market with lower expected demand.
Keywords: Entry Deterrence Game, Asymmetric Information, Ambiguity,
Message-Monotone Equilibrium.
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4.1 Introduction
Games with incomplete information typically involve the situation in which the
players are uncertain about some important parameters of the game, such as the
payoff functions, the strategies available to various players, or the information that
other players have about the game. The normal form of such games is well studied (
Harsanyi, 1967, 1968a, 1968b). Extensive-form games with incomplete information
in which one informed player, who possesses private information, sends a signal to
a second party, who thereupon takes an action have been also widely considered as
signalling games (Spence, 1972, Cho & Kreps, 1987, Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991, etc.).
However, in most of the literature, it is assumed that the probability distributions
entertained by the different players are mutually ”consistent”, in the sense that
they can be regarded as conditional probability distributions derived from a certain
“basic probability distribution” or “common prior” over the parameters unknown
to the various players.
In this chapter, we introduce a different concept of the asymmetric information
structure in an entry deterrence game between one more informed player and
one less informed player. The established firm is more informed since it has
already made investment commitment. Either it has knowledge of the true state
of the market (the aggregate demand, costs, for example), or at least, it has
confidence in the probability distribution of the state. While the potential entrant
has little information and hence little confidence regarding to the true state
of the market, it may have a set of probability measures over the state space.
These two different situations with respect to uncertainty are distinguished by
Knight (1921). The situation in which the uncertainty can be governed by a
unique probability measure is called “measurable uncertainty” or “risk”. In
contrast, we use “Knightian uncertainty” or“ambiguity” to refer to situations in
which individuals cannot or do not assign subjective probabilities to uncertain
events. The Ellsberg Paradox (Ellsberg, 1963) has shown that this distinction
is behaviourally meaningful since people treat ambiguous bets differently from
risky bets. Importantly, the lack of confidence reflected by choices in the Ellsberg
Paradox cannot be rationalized by any probabilistic belief; see Ellsberg (1963).
In the literature, theoretical models of individual preferences for decisions under
ambiguity include Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU) (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989),
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smooth ambiguity preference (Klibanoff et al., 2005), and variational representation
of preferences (Maccheroni, et al., 2006).
In a seminal study of limiting pricing and entry deterrence models with incom-
plete information, Milgrom and Roberts (1982) formulated a two-period two-firm
model in which the firms know the realizations of their own unit costs but those
of their opponent. However, the joint distribution of the costs is common knowl-
edge. In their setting, both firms face “measurable uncertainty” regarding their
opponent’s costs. They studied the impact of the information asymmetries on the
entry probability compared with the complete information case. We introduce
“Knightian uncertainty” in a simplified version of the Milgrom-Roberts model and
discuss two cases of information asymmetry between the established firm and the
potential entrant.
We formulate a two-period game in which the payoffs of the two players depend
on an aggregate demand function with two possible alternatives. In the first model,
the established firm (firm 1) is fully informed of the true state, while the potential
entrant (firm 2) lacks sufficiently precise information to assign a unique probability
measure governing the uncertainty and instead has a set of priors on the state. We
identify the conditions under which limit pricing emerges in equilibrium and discuss
the impact of ambiguity on the probability of entry. We compare our results with
other two situations: the situation in which firm 2 is also informed of the true
state and the situation in which firm 2 faces measurable uncertainty.
However, the established firm may not know the realization of demand but only
expected demand before it begins to produce and enters the market. Therefore,
we formulate a second model in which both of the firms face uncertainty, but firm
1 is under risk, while firm 2 is under ambiguity. Since we employ a linear demand
function, choosing quantity as firm 1’s strategy in the first period is equivalent to
choosing price. In this model, firm 1 chooses a price to charge in the first period,
and it will learn the realization of the uncertain demand in the first period. Firm
2 updates its set of priors after observing the price charged by firm 1 in the first
period and decides whether to enter the market. If firm 2 enters, it also makes an
investment commitment and learns the real prior immediately; then the two firms
engage in Cournot competition. Otherwise, firm 1 remains its monopoly. From
the information structure, we can see that firm 1 has an informational advantage
in both pre- and post-entry markets.
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We focus on the second model and characterize a message-monotone equilibrium
in which firm 1’s strategy (price charged in the first period) is weakly increasing
in the probability of high aggregate demand. One of the main findings is that,
in this equilibrium, the limit pricing strategy emerges when the probability of
high demand is between two thresholds and the entrant is deterred by the limit
pricing. The lower threshold is the point at which firm 2 is indifferent between
entering the market and staying out the market. The upper threshold is the point
at which firm 1 is indifferent between engaging in limit pricing to successfully deter
the entrant and charging the monopoly price to induce entry. We use Maxmin
Expected Utility (MEU) to represent firm 2’s preferences with respect to ambiguity
aversion. Compared with the symmetric information case in which firm 2 also knows
the distribution of the unknown parameter, the entrant behaves more cautiously
when there is ambiguity. The probability that entry actually occurs in such an
equilibrium is equal to or less than that in a symmetric information case. However,
the entry probability decreases only when the degree of ambiguity is large enough
that the indifference point of firm 2 is located in the set of its priors. A welfare
analysis reveals that the changes in expected consumer surplus due to limit pricing
are increasing in the expected aggregate demand under certain standard conditions.
However, limit pricing decreases the expected industry surplus and total welfare.
Further, it is more harmful in a market with higher expected demand than in a
market with lower expected demand.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 briefly
discusses a model in which the established firm is completely informed of the
demand function but the entrant is not informed and instead has multi-priors on
the unknown parameter in the demand function. Section 4.3 is the main part of
this chapter. In this section, we describe a model in which both firms are uncertain
about the demand function, but there is asymmetric information with respect to
uncertainty. The established firm is under risk, but the entrant is under ambiguity.
In this section, we characterize one message-monotone equilibrium and discuss the
impact of ambiguity. Section 4.4 discusses the impact of information asymmetry
on welfare. Finally, section 4.5 presents the conclusions.
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4.2 Entry deterrence game under uncertainty on
one side
4.2.1 Description of the game
Consider the market for a homogeneous good in which there are an established
firm, denoted firm 1, and a potential entrant, denoted firm 2. The inverse demand
function for the industry output is P = a − bQ. The parameter a is assumed
to be one of the two possible values aH and aL, with 0 < aL < aH . Thus
a = aH reflects a higher aggregate demand state than a = aL. A two-period
model of entry deterrence and entry under incomplete information proceeds as
follows: At stage 0, nature selects the value of a according to a distribution
P(a = aH) = 1 − P(a = aL) = x ∈ [0, 1] and fixes a through the next two
periods. Firm 1 is informed the value of a. But firm 2 only has knowledge that
x ∈ [x, x] ⊆ [0, 1].
At stage 1, firm 1 has to choose a price to charge for the production. Observing
the price charged by firm 1, firm 2 decides to enter the market or not.
At stage 2, if firm 2 decides to enter the market and makes commitment on the
investment with a fixed cost K, it also can learn the value of a and the two firms
proceed Cournot competition in this stage. Otherwise, if firm 2 doesn’t enter, firm
1 will enjoy the monopoly profit.
We assume that the firms are risk neutral and ambiguity averse. The unit costs,
ci, i = 1, 2, which are constants, and the description of the game are common
knowledge.
4.2.2 Strategies and payoffs
The price selected by firm 1 in the first period influences the choice of firm 2, which
will affect the total profit of firm 1 in the whole two periods. Therefore, if we
restrict attention to the pure strategy, a strategy of firm 1 is a mapping:
s : {aL, aH} → R+,
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where s(a) is the price chosen by firm 1 in the first period conditional on a,
a ∈ {aL, aH}. A pure strategy of firm 2 is a mapping:
t : R+ → {0, 1}.
Then t(s) = 0 means that firm 2 decides to stay out of the market observing price
s, and t(s) = 1 implies that firm 2 decides to enter the market observing price s.
In order to derive the total payoffs of the two firms, let us analyze the post-entry
Cournot duopoly market first. If firm 2 decides to enter the market, it also learns
the value of a, this is a typical one shot game with complete information. In this
sub-game, the profit of firm i, i, j = 1, 2 conditional on a is given by
ΠiC =
(a− 2ci + cj)2
9b
.
Given the strategy t of firm 2, a strategy s gives a total payoff to firm 1:
Π1 = Π11 + δ1Π
1
2
=
(s− c1)(a− s)
b
+ δ[t(s)Π1C + (1− t(s))Π1M ],
where Π1M is the monopoly profit if firm 2 doesn’t enter the market, and
Π1M =
(a− c1)2
4b
.
Therefore, the total profit of firm 1 is
Π1 =
(s− c1)(a− s)
b
+ δ
[
t(s)
(a− 2c1 + c2)2
9b
+ (1− t(s))(a− c1)
2
4b
]
. (4.1)
To derive the expected profit of firm 2 is a bit complicate since firm 2 thinks in
terms of a set of probability laws of the unknown parameter a, that is, it assigns an
interval [x, x] to the probability of a = aH . Here we adopt the Maxmin Expected
Utility (MEU) in Gilboa & Schmeidler(1989) to represent firm 2’s ambiguity
aversion. Formally and generally, the multiple-prior model postulates the following
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utility function on the set of AA acts:
UMP (h) = min
p∈C
∫
Ω
u(h)dp.
Here, u : ∆(C)→ R is a vNM functional on lotteries that is affine. Conditional on
any observed s ∈ R+, firm 2 assigns probabilities to s having been the choice of
each type of firm 1, then firm 2 updates its set of priors first. Denote the updated
set of priors as [x′, x′]. For each s, the expected payoff of firm 2 with a strategy
t(s) is:
Π2 = min
x∈[x′,x′]
E[t(s)(Π2C(a)−K)]. (4.2)
4.2.3 Equilibrium Analysis
A pair of strategies profile (s∗, t∗) forms a Nash equilibrium if, s∗ maximizes firm
1’s total payoff (4.1) given t∗, and t∗ is a best response for any observed s given s∗,
that is, t∗ maximizes (4.2) for each s. Since there are only two possible alternatives
of a, firm 1 has only two types. Therefore, in equilibrium, the only values of s
which could be observed are s∗(aL) and s∗(aH). Now in this set-up there only exist
either pooling equilibria, that is, s∗(aL) = s∗(aH), or separating equilibria, that is,
s∗(aL) 6= s∗(aH). We will discuss the conditions of the Nash equilibrium under the
following assumptions:
Assumption 4.1.
(i). Π2C(a
L)−K < 0 and Π2C(aH)−K > 0.
(ii). aL − 2c2 + c1 > 0.
Assumption 4.2. Firm 2’s optimal choice is staying out of the market under it’s
original information.
Assumption 4.1(i) just simply means that firm 2 won’t enter the market if it is
informed that a = aL and it will enter the market if a = aH . Assumption 4.1(2)
implies that if firm 2 enters the market, then it produces positive quantity in the
Cournot market even at the low state of demand. Under Maxmin Expected utility,
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Assumption 4.2 can be explicitly expressed as:
min
x∈[x,x]
E[(Π2C(a)−K)]
= min
x∈[x,x]
(ae(x)− 2c2 + c1)2
9b
−K
=
(ae(x)− 2c2 + c1)2
9b
−K < 0,
where ae(x) = xaH + (1 − x)aL is the expectation of a under the law of a,
P(aH) = x. The last equality holds because of A4.2(ii). Let f(x) = (a
e(x)−2c2+c1)2
9b
,
then f ′(x) > 0, ∀ x ∈ [0, 1], and f ′(0) > 0.
In a pooling equilibrium (s∗, t∗), s∗(aH) = s∗(aL) = s. Given the strategy of
firm 1, firm 2 can’t learn any information observing s. Therefore, firm 2 still has the
set of multiple priors [x, x]. Assumption 4.2 implies that the best response of firm
2 conditional on s is t∗(s) = 0. If firm 1 uses separating strategy, firm 2 can learn
the true value of a, therefore, the ambiguity is resolved. Then we are back to the
model with complete information. Clearly, there exist multiple equilibria, however,
we’re interested in the “efficient equilibrium” where the competition between types
of firm 1 won’t be unnecessarily wasteful. The following proposition provides the
conditions under which a pooling equilibrium or a separating equilibrium exists.
Proposition 4.1. A pooling equilibrium,s
s∗(aH) = s∗(aL) = sM(aH)
t∗(s) =
 0 if s ≤ s
M(aH)
1 otherwise
exists if
Π11(s
M(aH)) + δΠ1M(a
L) > Π1M(a
L) + δΠ1C(a
L). (4.3)
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Otherwise, if (4.3) doesn’t hold, there exists a separating equilibrium:
s∗(aH) = sM(aH); s∗(aL) = sM(aL)
t∗(s) =
 0 if s < s
M(aH)
1 if s ≥ sM(aH).
Where sM(at) is the monopoly price of type t, and sM(at) = a+c
t
2
, for t ∈ {L,H}.
As long as we clarify the updated set of priors of firm 2, the proof is quite
straightforward, we omit the proof here. Since sM (aL) < sM (aH), the limit pricing
emerges when condition (4.3) holds.
4.2.4 Discussion of the impact of ambiguity
We can discuss the impact of the ambiguity by comparing with other two situations:
firm 2 is also informed the value of a, and firm 2 is informed the true distribution
of a.
Situation 1: firm 2 is also completely informed. In this case, there doesn’t exist
pooling equilibrium, that is, limit pricing doesn’t emerge. Therefore, ambiguity
decreases the probability of entry comparing with regime with complete information
if condition (4.3) holds. Otherwise, if (4.3) doesn’t hold, ambiguity has no influence
on the probability of entry.
Situation 2: firm 2 is informed of the true distribution of a. In this case, firm 2
is under “measurable uncertainty” or “risk”. We denote the true distribution as
P(a = aH) = 1− P(a = aL) = x0. In order to discuss the impact of ambiguity, we
need to address different cases combining the condition (4.3) and the following one:
(ae(x0)− 2c2 + c1)2
9b
−K < 0. (4.4)
If both (4.3) and (4.4) hold, limit pricing emerges just as the ambiguity situation.
In this case, ambiguity doesn’t influence the probability of entry. If (4.4) doesn’t
hold, limit pricing doesn’t emerge. Then ambiguity decreases the probability of
entry if (4.3) also holds.
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4.3 Entry deterrence game with asymmetric in-
formation on uncertainty
4.3.1 Description of the asymmetric information structure
In the previous model, the established firm has knowledge of the true state of the
demand before it makes move in the first period, and firm 2 is even unaware of
the distribution of the state. However, even though firm 1 has committed the
investment (for example, set up the plants, did some market research, etc.), it is
still difficult to know the true state before it sets a price and sells the production in
the market. In this section, we modify the structure of the information asymmetries
in the entry deterrence game as both the firms are uncertain on the true state
of the demand. Since the established firm has committed the investment, it has
collected more precise information of the market. In this setting, firm 1 knows
the true distribution of a, that is, it knows that x = x0. Firm 2 is in the same
situation as the previous model, it has multiple priors on a, x ∈ [x, x] ⊆ [0, 1]. We
assume that x0 ∈ [x, x] for consistency. The asymmetric information situation is
common knowledge but not the information itself. The rest of the description of
the game is the same as the model in section 4.2. The production unit cost ci
of firm i (i = 1, 2) is constant and known to both firms. Firms are risk-neutral
and ambiguity averse, and firms 2’s ambiguity aversion is represented by Maxmin
Expected Utility.
4.3.2 Strategies and payoffs
In order to simplify the the payoff functions, we take the method given by Milgrom
and Roberts (1982) to normalize the profit to firm 1 in the second period to be
zero if entry occurs. Otherwise firm 1 gets a reward which equals to the difference
between the monopoly profit and the Cournot profit if entry doesn’t occur. We
assume that firm 2 can learn the distribution of a immediately as soon as it decides
to enter the market and makes investment commitment with a fixed cost K. Firm
1 learnt the true state of a by observing its demand in the first period. Under this
framework, firm 1 has information advantage both in the pre-entry market and in
the post-entry market.
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We analyze the post-entry Cournot duopoly market first, which is a typical
one shot game with incomplete information on one side. In this sub-game, firm 1’s
pure strategy is to choose an output level conditional on a, Q1(·) : {aH , aL} → R+,
to maximize it’s profit:
max
Q1
[a− b(Q1 +Q2)− c1]Q1.
Given the quantity of production of firm 2, Q2, the reaction curve of firm 1 is:
Q1(Q2; a) =
a− bQ2 − c1
2b
. (4.5)
Firm 2’s pure strategy is to choose an output level Q2 conditional on x, Q2(·) :
[0, 1]→ R+, to maximize its expected profit:
max
Q2
Ea[a− b(Q1(a) +Q2)− c2]Q2
= max
Q2
[ae(x)− b(Qe1(x) +Q2)− c2]Q2,
where ae(x) = xaH + (1− x)aL and Qe1(x) = xQ1(aH) + (1− x)Q1(aL). Then the
reaction curve of firm 2 is:
Q2(Q1;x) =
ae(x)− bQe1(x)− c2
2b
. (4.6)
We can get the Equilibrium Cournot quantities from equation (4.5) and (4.6):
Q2(x) =
ae(x) + c1 − 2c2
3b
,
Q1(a) =
3a− ae(x)− 4c1 + 2c2
6b
, for a ∈ {aH , aL}.
According to the aggregate demand function, we can obtain the ex post equilibrium
price which firm 1 can anticipate ex ante:
P (a) =
3a− ae(x) + 2c1 + 2c2
6
, for a ∈ {aH , aL}.
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Now we can compute the Cournot profit of firm 1 conditional on a:
Π1C(a, x) = [P (a)− c1]Q1(a)
=
(3a− ae(x)− 4c1 + 2c2)2
36b
,
and the expected Cournot profit of firm 2:
Πe2C(x) = Ea[P (a)− c2]Q2(x)
=
(ae(x) + c1 − 2c2)2
9b
.
As long as we pin down the Cournot competition game in the second period, we
can analyze the strategies and payoffs of the two firms in the two periods. As we
illustrated in the game description, firm 1’s strategy in the first period influences
its total payoff, and it also serves as a signal transferred to firm 2 to influence firm
2’s decision in the second period. We restrict attention to pure strategy equilibria.
Denote the pure strategy of firm 1 as:
s : [0, 1]→ R+,
then s(x) is the price chosen by firm 1 in the first period conditional on the
probability distribution of a. Denote the pure strategy of firm 2 as:
t : R+ → {0, 1}.
If firm 2 decides to stay out of the market observing s, then t(s) = 0. Otherwise,
if firm 2 decides to enter the market, then t(s) = 1. Given these strategies, we
can write down the total expected payoffs of the two firms. Let Πe1(s;x, t) and
Πe2(t;x, s) be the total expected profits of firm 1 and firm 2 respectively. Then
Πe1(s;x, t) = Π
0e
1 (s;x) + δ1R
e(x)(1− t)
= Π0e1 (s;x) + δ1Ex[ΠM(a)− Π1C(a, x)](1− t),
and
Πe2(t;x, s) = δ2t(s)[Π
e
2C(x)−K],
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where δi is the discount factor of firm i, i = 1, 2, Π
0e
1 (s;x) is firm 1’s expected profit
in the first period if it chooses price s, and Re(x) is firm 1’s expected reward profit
if it succeeds in deterring firm 2 which is equal to the expected monopoly profit
Ea[ΠM(a)] minus the expected Cournot profit Ea[Π1C(a, x)]. If firm 1 decides to
reveal itself in the first period, then knowing the probability distribution of a, firm
1 chooses a monopoly price to maximize its expected profit:
max
s
E
[
(s− c1)(a− s)
b
]
.
Solving this optimization problem,
seM(x) =
ae(x) + c1
2
,
then we can get the expected monopoly profit.
Ea[ΠM(a)] = Π
e
1M(x) =
[ae(x)− c1]2
4b
.
To make things interesting, we assume that firm 1’s expected monopoly profit is
greater than its expected Cournot profit, that is, Πe1M(x) > Π
e
1C(x).
4.3.3 Equilibrium analysis
Again, we adopt the Maxmin Expected Utility to represent the ambiguity aversion of
firm 2 with multiple priors . Assume that firm 1 plays some strategy s : [0, 1]→ R+,
then any P (price) in the range of s, firm 2 updates its set of priors by x ∈ s−1(P ).
Firm 2’s best response is “enter” if and only if the minimum expected value of
the post-entry profit, infx∈s−1(P )(Πe2C(x)−K), is positive. Formally, we give the
definition of Nash equilibrium as follows:
Definition 4.1. A strategy profile (s∗, t∗) is a Nash equilibrium of the entry
deterrence game if it satisfies the following conditions:
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(i) for any x ∈ [0, 1] and any s : [0, 1]→ R+
Π0e1 (s
∗;x)+δ1Re(x)(1− t∗(s∗)) ≥
Π0e1 (s;x) + δ1R
e(x)(1− t∗(s)).
(ii) for any t : R+ → {0, 1}, for all P ∈ R+, such that ∃x ∈ [0, 1], s∗(x) = P ,
inf
x∈{x:s∗(x)=P}
t∗(P )(Πe2C(x)−K) ≥ inf
x∈{x:s∗(x)=P}
t(P )(Πe2C(x)−K).
For simplicity, we analyze the equilibrium under an additional assumption:
Assumption 4.3. [x, x] = [0, 1], c2 ≥ c1 and δ1 = 1.
In the equilibrium analysis, we focus on message-monotone equilibrium (Y.
Chen, 2011).
Definition 4.2. In a message-monotone equilibrium in the entry deterrence game,
the strategy of firm 1, s(x), is weakly increasing in x.
The continuity of the duopoly Cournot payoff function together with assumption
4.1 imply that there exists a belief xˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that firm 2 is indifferent between
“enter” and “not enter”. With a simple calculation, we can get the indifferent point
which is:
xˆ =
√
9bK − (aL + c1 − 2c2)
aH − aL .
Since we assume that ΠeM (x) > Π
e
1C(a, x) for all x ∈ [0, 1], which implies that firm
1 has incentive to deter the entrant by sacrificing the profit in the first period
due to charging a lower price. And it’s getting more and more costly to deter the
entrant as x increases. Under assumption δ1 = 1, the indifference point of firm 1,
x˜ , satisfies the following condition (see Appendix A for details):
(ae(xˆ)− c1)2
4
=
(ae(x˜)− 2c1 + c2)2
9
.
Given these two critical points xˆ and x˜ together with assumptions A4.1-A4.3, we
can get the following property of a Nash equilibrium:
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Proposition 4.2. In this entry deterrence model, under A4.1-A4.4, a Nash equi-
librium (s∗, t∗) is a message-monotone equilibrium.
The proof is given in Appendix B.
An increasing x indicates a higher expected aggregate demand. With message-
monotone strategies, firm 1 sends a more attractive message to firm 2 by choosing a
non-decreasing price when the expected aggregate demand increases. On the other
hand, observing a higher price, firm 2 can induce a higher expected demand. There-
fore, firm 2’s strategy is also non-decreasing with respect to the price it observed.
The following theorem characterizes such a message-monotone equilibrium.
Theorem 4.1. Under the assumptions A4.1-A4.3, there exists a message-monotone
equilibrium (s∗, t∗) in the entry deterrence game in two different cases:
(i) if x˜ ≤ xˆ, then there exists a separating equilibrium (s∗, t∗):
s∗(x) = seM(x) ∀x ∈ [0, 1],
t∗(s) =
0, if s ≤ s
e
M(xˆ)
1, otherwise
(ii) if x˜ ≥ xˆ, then there exists a semi-separating equilibrium (s∗, t∗):
s∗(x) =
s
e
M(x) if x ∈ [0, xˆ) ∪ (min{x˜, 1}, 1]
seM(xˆ) if x ∈ [xˆ,min{x˜, 1}],
t∗(s) =
0, if s ≤ s
e
M(xˆ)
1, otherwise
Proof (see the appendix C)
Remark In the first case, for any level of expected demand, it is so costly to deter
the entrant that the reward is not large enough to compensate the lost if firm 1
conducts limit pricing in the first period, therefore, limit pricing doesn’t emerge
in this situation. In the second case, in contrast, when the expected demand is
low enough such that the entrant is not interested in entering the market, firm 1
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doesn’t need to conduct limit pricing. Or the expected demand is high enough that
the signal sent by firm 1 is also high such that the entrant will enter the market
observing the signal, then it is unnecessary for firm 1 to conduct limit pricing. But
when the expected demand is between the two thresholds, limit pricing emerges.
4.4 Welfare Analysis
4.4.1 The impact of ambiguity on expected welfares
In this sector, we discuss the impact of ambiguity by comparing our results with
the situation where firm 2 is also informed the probability distribution of a. If there
doesn’t exist information asymmetries between firm 1 and firm 2, then firm 1 cannot
deter firm 2 by conducting limit pricing because firm 2 doesn’t need to induce any
information from the behavior of firm 1 in the first period. Firm 2 will choose
to enter the market when x > xˆ and stay out the market otherwise. Therefore,
limit pricing doesn’t emerge and firm 1 just charges the expected monopoly price
in the first period for any x ∈ [0, 1]. In order to discuss the impact of ambiguity
on expected welfare, we just need to analyze the impact of limit pricing on the
expected welfares.
To focus on the impact of limit pricing, we assume that xˆ < x˜ ≤ 1.
Consumer’s surplus: In the previous section, we have shown that the price
decreases from the expected monopoly price PM(x) = s
e
M(x) to the limit price
PM(xˆ) = s
e
M(xˆ) when x ∈ [xˆ, x˜] in the first period, and
PM(xˆ)− PM(x) = a
e(xˆ)− ae(x)
2
< 0.
Due to limit pricing, the entrant is deterred in the second period, the monopoly
price is greater than the Cournot price:
PM(a)− PC(a) = a+ c1
2
− 3a− a
e(x) + 2c1 + 2c2
6
=
ae(x) + c1 − 2c2
6
> 0.
Therefore, the consumer’s surplus increases in the first period and decreases in the
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second period. The change of total consumer’s surplus is ambiguous. However, we
still can analyze the changes of consumer’s surplus with respect to the state of the
market. We can clearly see that the price decreases in the first period faster than
it increases in the second period as x increases, i.e.∣∣∣∣∂(PM(xˆ)− PM(x))∂x
∣∣∣∣ > ∂(PM(a)− PC(a))∂x .
Therefore, we expect that the consumer’s surplus increases in x. Formally, The
net consumer’s surplus from without limit pricing to limit pricing is:
∆SC = −
∫ PM (xˆ)
PM (x)
a− p
b
dp−
∫ PM (a)
PC(a)
a− p
b
dp
∂∆E(SC)
∂x
=
aH − aL
2
[
E
[
a− PM(x)
b
]
− 1
3
E
[
a− PC(a)
b
]]
=
aH − aL
2
(Ex[QM ]− 1
3
Ex[QC ])
=
aH − aL
2
(QeM(x)−
1
3
QeC(x))
We can see that the expected consumer’s surplus is increasing in x as long as the
expected aggregate monopoly production Ex[QM ] at x is greater than one third of
the expected aggregate Cournot production Ex[QC ].
Firm’s surplus : Firm’s surplus is equal to firm’s profit. The net firm’s surplus
from without limit pricing to limit pricing is:
E[∆SF ] = Πe1M(xˆ) + Π
e
1M(a)− (Πe1M(x) + Π1C(a) + Πe2C(x))
= {(PM(xˆ)− c1)QM(xˆ)) + (PM(a)− c1)QM(a)}
− {(PM(x)− c1)QM(x) + (PC(a)− c1)Q1C + (PC(a)− c2)Q2C}
=
(PM(xˆ)− c1)2
4b
+
(PM(a)− c1)2
4b
−
{
(PM(x)− c1)2
4b
+
(PC(a)− c1)2
b
+
(PC(a)− c2)(ae(x) + c1 − 2c2)
3b
}
=
(ae(xˆ)− c1)2
4b
−
(
(ae(x)− 2c1 + c2)2
9b
+
(ae(x)− 2c2 + c1)2
9b
)
.
The net industry’ surplus equals to the difference between the expected monopoly
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profit at xˆ and the total expected Cournot profits at x. Since x > xˆ, the net
industry’s surplus is negative if c2 is not very large. We conclude that deterring an
moderate cost entrant by limit pricing harms the industry. Moreover,
∂E[∆SF ]
∂x
= −2(a
H − aL)(ae(x)− c1 − c2)
9b
= −2(a
H − aL)QeC(x)
3
< 0,
where QeC(x) is the expected total Cournot production at x if firm 2 enters the
market in the second period. This result shows that the limit pricing harms the
industry more in a market with higher expected demand than a lower one.
Total welfare: The total welfare is the sum of the consumer’s surplus and the
firm’s surplus. Therefore,
∆TW = ∆SC + ∆SF ,
and
∂E[∆TW ]
∂x
= −(a
H − aL)
6
(3QeM(x)− 5QeC(x))< 0 if 3QeM(x)− 5QeC(x) < 0> 0 if 3QeM(x)− 5QeC(x) > 0.
Limit pricing decreases the total social welfare more in a higher expected demand
market than in a lower one when the expected monopoly output is less than 60%
of the expected Cournot output.
In a general framework, if firm 2 has a set of priors x ∈ [x, x], the impact of
ambiguity on expected welfare occurs only when an increase of ambiguity changes
the strategy of firm 1 from non-limit pricing to limit pricing, or vice versa . As
we can see from the equilibrium analysis, limit pricing doesn’t occur as long as
the realization of x is in the region [x, xˆ] ∪ [x˜, x]. Therefore, the ambiguity doesn’t
influence the strategy of firm 1 or the welfare when x ∈ [x, xˆ] ∪ [x˜, x]. Ambiguity
decreases the total expected welfare when x ∈ [xˆ, x˜] comparing with symmetric
information situation. However, the change of the degree of ambiguity influences
the welfare only when firm 2’s set of priors changes such that x moves from one
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side of xˆ to the other. We present an example in the next section to illustrate the
results.
4.4.2 An example
In this section, we provide a numerical example to compute the equilibrium
strategies in the entry deterrence game with asymmetric information on uncertainty.
Suppose that aH = 10, aL = 5, b = 1, δ1 = δ2 = 1, c1 = c2 = 1, K = 3.5. The
probability distribution of a is P(a = aH) = 1− P(a = aL) = x. The set of priors
of firm 2 on the distribution of a is [0, 1]. One can compute that the indifferent
point of firm 2 is xˆ = 0.322, and the indifferent point of firm 1 is x˜ = 0.884. The
expected monopoly price charged by firm 1 at x = xˆ is: seM(xˆ) =
ae(xˆ)+c1
2
= 3.805.
At equilibrium, the message-monotone strategy of firm 1 is:
s∗(x) =
3.805 if x ∈ [0.322, 0.884)5x+6
2
if x ∈ [0, 0.322) ∪ [0.884, 1],
and the strategy of firm 2 is
t∗(s) =
0 if s ≤ 3.8051 if s > 3.805.
In this example firm 1 can take the advantage of the information asymmetries by
using pooling strategy to deter the entrant if the probability of the higher aggregate
demand is not too low or too high. In this example, we can see (Figure 2) that
both the expected consumer’s surplus and the expected industry’s surplus decrease
due to the limit pricing, and limit pricing also decreases the expected total welfare.
The expected net consumer’s surplus is increasing in x but the expected total
welfare is decreasing in x, which means that the established firm has to sacrifice
more profits in the first period in order to deter the entrant in a market with higher
expected demand. This result suggests that an antitrust policy is more important
in a market with higher expected demand.
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Figure 4.1: The response functions in the Cournot competion game
Figure 4.2: The changes of welfare due to limit pricing
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4.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we re-examine the entry deterrence game in which two firms have
asymmetric information (Milgrom & Roberts, 1982) but under different information
structures. We formulate two models with asymmetric information. In both models,
the entrant faces ambiguity about the true state, in the sense that it has multiple
priors on the true state. In the first model, the established firm is fully informed
of the true state, and in the second model, the established firm is only informed
of the distribution of the true state. The informational advantage encourages
the established firm to send an unattractive signal to the entrant by engaging in
limit pricing in the first period and deters the entrant under certain circumstances.
Compared with symmetric information, ambiguity decreases the probability of
entry under certain conditions, but it is also possible for it to have no influence
on the probability of entry. A numerical example reveals that both the expected
consumer surplus and the expected industry surplus are decreased due to limit
pricing, and thus total welfare is decreased. Deterring a moderate-cost entrant
harms social welfare to a greater extent in a market with higher expected demand
than in one with lower expected demand. However, in our analysis, we assume, for
simplicity, that firm 1 is also informed of firm 2’s set of priors. An extension of
the analysis in which firm 2 also has private information on its set of priors is not
trivial and the results would be different.
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APPENDIX
A. The indifferent point x˜ of firm 1
If firm 1 knows that P(a = aH) = x > xˆ, it can choose to reveal this information
to firm 2 by separating strategy or to conceal the information by pooling strategy.
Assume that at x˜, firm 1 is indifferent between separating and pooling. If firm 1
reveals x˜ to firm 2, it chooses the monopoly price in the first period sm(x˜) =
ae(x˜)+c1
2
and it allows firm 2 to enter the market. The total expected profit of firm 1 is the
expected monopoly profit in the first period:
Πe1M(x˜) =
(ae(x˜)− c1)2
4b
.
But if firm 1 chooses to conceal the information and successfully deters the entrant,
the optimal price it can choose is
s(x˜) = sm(xˆ) =
ae(xˆ) + c1
2
and it will get a total expected profit:
Πe1(xˆ, x˜) = Π
e
1M(xˆ) + δ1R
e(x˜)
=
(ae(xˆ)− c1)2
4b
+ δ1Ea[
(a− c1)2
4b
− (3a− a
e(x˜)− 4c1 + 2c2)2
36b
]
=
(ae(xˆ)− c1)2
4b
+ δ1[
V ar(a) + (ae(x˜)− c1)2
4b
− 9V ar(a) + (2a
e(x˜)− 4c1 + 2c2)2
36b
]
=
(ae(xˆ)− c1)2
4b
+ δ1[
(ae(x˜)− c1)2
4b
− (a
e(x˜)− 2c1 + c2)2
9b
]
Let Πe1M(x˜) = Π
e
1(xˆ, x˜), we can get that the indifferent point x˜ satisfies:
(ae(xˆ)− c1)2
4
= (1− δ1)(a
e(x˜)− c1)2
4
+ δ1
(ae(x˜)− 2c1 + c2)2
9
.
If we take δ1 = 1, then we have
(ae(xˆ)− c1)2
4
=
(ae(x˜)− 2c1 + c2)2
9
.
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B. Proof of Proposition 4.2
Proof. In this proposition, we intent to prove that at equilibrium, for ∀x1, x2 ∈ [0, 1],
if x1 < x2, then s
∗
1 = s
∗(x1) ≤ s∗(x2) = s∗2. For the case that xˆ < x˜, there are four
possibilities that can occur at equilibrium:
(i). t∗(s∗1) = t
∗(s∗2) = 0;
(ii). t∗(s∗1) = 0, and t
∗(s∗2) = 1;
(iii). t∗(s∗1) = 1, and t
∗(s∗2) = 1.
(iv). t∗(s∗1) = 1, and t
∗(s∗2) = 0;
In each case, we can show that a violation of the monotonicity leads to a deviation
from the equilibrium. Let A1 = {x : s∗(x) = s∗1} and A2 = {x : s∗(x) = s∗2} be
the strategies of firm 1 at the particular equilibrium. By contradiction, we assume
that s∗1 > s
∗
2.
For case (i), let x∗1 = inf{x : s∗(x) = s∗1} and x∗2 = inf{x : s∗(x) = s∗2}. Due to
the strictly increasing of Πe2C(x) in x, firm 2 takes x
∗
1 and x
∗
2 as the worst case by
MaxMin utility. If firm 2 doesn’t enter the market at x∗1 and x
∗
2, then the optimal
response of firm 1 will be
s∗1 =
ae(x∗1) + c1
2b
, and s∗2 =
ae(x∗2) + c1
2b
.
If s∗1 > s
∗
2, then x
∗
2 < x
∗
1 ≤ x1 < x2. Then the type x2 of firm 1 would deviate to s∗1.
By deviation, x2 ∈ A1, and still we have x∗1 = inf A1, which doesn’t influence the
decision of firm 2. The x2 type of firm 1 can get higher profit in the first period
and the same monopoly profit in the second period.
For case (ii), we have similar argument. If s∗1 > s
∗
2, and firm 2 enters the market
observing s∗2, then type x2 of firm 1 would deviate to get higher profit in the first
period and deter the entry by choosing s∗1.
For case (iii), since both s∗1 and s
∗
2 can’t deter the entry, type x2 of firm 1 would
deviate to get higher profit in the first period by choosing s∗1.
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For case (iv), Firstly, we show x∗1 = x1. If x
∗
1 < x1, then s
∗
1 <
ae(x1)+c1
2b
. Since
s∗1 induces entry, x1 type of firm 1’s profit is Π
e
1M (x
∗
1). However, the worst case by
choosing s1 is inducing entry and the profit is Π
e
1M(x1), and Π
e
1M(x
∗
1) < Π
e
1M(x1).
The x1 type of firm 1 would deviate to s1 =
ae(x1)+c1
2b
. So x∗1 = x1. Now let’s show
that if s∗1 > s
∗
2, one type of firm 1 would deviate. At equilibrium, x
∗
2 < x1 < x2
and the profits of firm 1 given by:
Πe1(s
∗
1;x1) = Π
e
M(x1)
Πe1(s
∗
2;x2) = Π
e
M(x
∗
2) +R
e(x2)
If Πe1(s
∗
1;x1) > Π
e
1(s
∗
2;x2), then x2 type of firm 1 would deviate. Choosing a higher
price s∗1 induces entry but it can get higher profit.
If Πe1(s
∗
1;x1) < Π
e
1(s
∗
2;x2), Equation (3) implies that
ΠeM(x
∗
2) +R
e(x2)− Πe1(x2) < ΠeM(x∗2) +Re(x1)− Πe1(x1). (4.7)
Since s∗2 is the optimal choice for x2 type of firm 1,
ΠeM(x
∗
2) +R
e(x2)− Πe1(x2) ≥ 0. (4.8)
From Equation (4) and (5), we obtain
ΠeM(x
∗
2) +R
e(x1)− Πe1(x1) > 0,
which implies that x1 type of firm 1 would deviate to get higher payoff by choosing
a lower price s∗2 . 
C. Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof. To prove this theorem, we just follow the definition of Nash Equilibrium
(Def. 2.1). Given the strategy of firm 1, observing s < (a
e(xˆ)−c1)
2
, firm 2 induces
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that x < xˆ. Firm 2 chooses to stay out of the market with maxmin preference. So
t∗ is an optimal response to s∗. On the other hand, Given the strategy of firm 2,
t∗, firm 1’s optimal strategy is to maximize its total expected profit. Let δ1 = 1,
then the total expected profits of firm 1 is:
Πe1(s;x) =
Π
0e
1 (s;x) +R
e(x) if s ≤ ae(xˆ)+c1
2b
Π0e1 (s;x) if s >
ae(xˆ)+c1
2b
,
We can show that the difference of the profits of firm 1 between deterring and not
deterring the entrant is decreasing in x if δ1 = 1:
d(Πe1(xˆ, x)− Πe1M(x))
dx
= −2(a
H − aL)(ae(x)− 2c1 + c2)
9b
< 0. (4.9)
And we have shown that firm 1 is indifferent at x = x˜. So firm 1 prefers deterring
to accommodating the entrant when x < x˜. When x˜ < xˆ, for any x ∈ [0, 1], firm 1
will choose the monopoly price in the first period because it is too costly to deter
the entrant. But when x˜ > xˆ, firm 1 has incentive to deter the entrant by pooling
strategies for x ∈ [xˆ, x˜] and what it can do the best is to choose the monoply price
at x = xˆ. Given the strategy of firm 2, for any x ∈ [0, 1], firm 1 doesn’t want to
deviate. 
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